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National Threat Perception: Survey Results from Canada

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the perceptions of Canadian political, bureaucratic and academic elites about security threats and the efficacy of various international institutions and proposals to meet those challenges. Based on our analysis of Official documents, elite survey and public opinion data, we found general elite agreement about the type of threats facing Canadians, with terrorism and manmade environmental problems among the most prominent issues. We argue that security concerns went hand in hand with a desire to main distinctiveness from the United States, and that this approach was reflected in the 2004 White Paper on security. Since the government adopted a more proactive approach in the 2005 ‘international policy statement’ after public opinion became increasingly preoccupied with the terrorist threat and receptive towards the adoption of tighter security measures, it appears that previous Liberal governments followed rather than led public opinion.

Elites also tended to agree on the choice of policy instruments to address security threats. Police cooperation/intelligence sharing and economic and financial assistance were more favoured than diplomacy as strategies to deal with terrorism. For what concerns the size and distribution of the defence budget, parliamentarians were much more likely to be satisfied than were civil servants and security experts. A majority of those who expressed an opinion about the ESDP agreed that a more autonomous ESDP would weaken NATO and lead to a retrenchment of the US commitment to European security. We propose that although Canadian elites will continue to support NATO, they regard it more as an arena within which they can, together with the Europeans, exercise some influence on the US, rather than as a direct provider of security.

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper explores Canadian political, bureaucratic and academic elites’ perceptions of security threats. It first briefly outlines the Canadian security environment pre- and post-11 September 2001 (henceforth 9/11), Canadian security culture, and the ‘official’ perception of threat, i.e. that publicly articulated by the Canadian government. The paper then analyses the perceptions of Canadian political, bureaucratic, and academic security elite, and compares them to the ‘official’ ones and, when survey data are available, to those of the public at large. Finally, the paper

offers some conclusions.

*The Canadian Security Environment:*¹ Canadian threat perceptions should be seen within the context of the Canadian security environment, the most important feature of which is the country's geographic position. Canada shares the world's longest border with the United States (US): 5,061 kilometres on land and 3,830 on water. Because of its geographic position, Canada could afford not to devote much attention or resources to security during the Cold War. Since the US considered Canadian security as its own, Canadian security needs were easily satisfied through membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bilateral relationships with the US such as in the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Canada's security policy could thus afford to emphasize – in public discourse at least - what Harvey (2003) has called 'distinction', namely those aspects perceived to enhance the country's international identity.² A central aspect of the policy of 'distinction' was to put the accent more on process than on substance. Canadian foreign policy came thus to be identified with 'multilateralism' understood both as 'the practice of multilateral diplomacy and ... policies supporting the establishment and maintenance of institutions and associations that facilitate and support the practice of multilateral diplomacy' (Keating 2002: 4).

The end of the Cold War did not change this situation. The Canadian government continued to assume that the ample US cloak provided Canada with all the security it needed. Indeed, during the 1990s, rather than re-evaluating threats and security needs as most European countries did (e.g. Croci 2003), Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien between 1996 and 2000, concentrated on promoting the concept of 'human security', which implies a shift in emphasis from state-centric to individual security concerns, and is understood as the general improvement of the quality of life conditions experienced by individuals (Axworthy 2003). Critics have charged that the concept of 'human security' does not provide any guidance to governmental policymaking and is a make-

1 This and the following section are based on Croci and Verdun (2007).

2 The term 'distinction' as used by Harvey and here, refers not only to sovereignty, independence and policy autonomy but also to an effort to distinguish Canada from the US, and hence retaining - some would say acquiring – a distinct identity. In fact, many argue that the Canadian identity is primarily defined in a negative manner, that is to say being Canadian means primarily being other than American.

feel-good concept aimed primarily at enhancing Canadian ‘distinction’ (e.g. Paris 2001: 88; Harvey 2003). Since 9/11, however, Canadian governments have toned down the rhetoric about ‘human security’ and privileged a state-centric understanding of security as well as the adoption of security policies at the national level or bilaterally, i.e. in cooperation with the US rather than multilaterally. After 9/11, in fact, the heightened concern of the American government for its own territorial security convinced the Canadian government to adopt a series of measures to reassure the US about the security of its northern border. Failure to act would probably have led Washington to tighten entry into the US from Canada for both people and goods. The consequent trade disruption between the two countries would have created serious economic difficulties for Canada since trade with the US accounts for 87 per cent of Canadian foreign trade in goods and services. The percentage is even bigger for the industrial heartland of Canada. A staggering 94 per cent of Ontario exports, for instance, go to the US. By contrast, trade with Canada accounts for only 16.5 per cent of US foreign trade. This share of trade makes Canada the largest US trading partner but it does not make US economic prosperity as dependent on trade with Canada as Canadian prosperity is on trade with the US. An October 2005 Ipsos Reid poll, however, revealed that process, instead of substance, and ‘distinction’ remain central elements of the image Canadians have of their country’s foreign policy. Thus, 36 per cent of them still believe that one of the top three priorities of the Canadian government should be ‘working actively with the UN to promote international cooperation’; fully 82 percent believe (39 percent strongly) that one of Canada’s most important roles in world affairs should be to act as a mediator in conflicts involving other countries; and 83 per cent agree (56 percent strongly) with the statement that ‘Canada should pursue its own independent policies even if this leads to certain problems in our relations with the US’.³ The core elements of Canadian ‘security culture’, defined as the ‘set of ideas relevant to security policy that are widely shared within a society or by its political elites’ (Duffield 1998: 22) can be summarised as shown in Table 2.1.

³ ‘Canadian Views on Canada’s Role in International Affairs’, <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

II. PERCEIVED SECURITY THREATS: THE OFFICIAL VIEW

In April 2004, the Canadian government published its first ever White Paper on national security entitled: *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Privy Council Office 2004). The paper identifies what the government regards as Canada's 'three core national security interests'. The first of these interests (protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad) is uncontroversial. The second (ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to its allies) is a signal sent to the US to counter the largely false but nevertheless widespread perception that Canada is the North American point of entry for terrorists intending to strike at the US. The third (contributing to international security) is a reassuring message sent to those Canadians who regard 'multilateralism' not as one policy instrument among many but as a value in itself and a key component of Canadian identity. The White Paper does not provide clear insights into what the government regards as the most serious threats to Canadian security. It lists a number of threats but does not rank them in order of gravity or immediacy. The list includes terrorism, whether state sponsored or motivated by religious extremism, violent secessionist movements, or domestic extremism. Then it mentions proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed and failing states, foreign espionage, natural disasters, critical infrastructure vulnerability, organized crime and pandemics.

A clearer image of the type of threats perceived by the Canadian government is provided by the 2003 and 2004-2005 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) public reports. Both rank terrorism as the 'most serious security threat' Canada faces. The threat is represented primarily by the activities of various terrorist groups and individuals operating in Canada, whether affiliated with Al Qaeda and like-minded groups or with secessionist groups abroad (e.g. the Tamil Tigers) on whose behalf they recruit and collect funds often through extortion from members of their ethnic communities. The CSIS reports then mention the danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which represents an indirect threat to Canada by endangering international peace and stability. Other threats identified by CSIS, but deemed to be of a lower order, are espionage, especially economic espionage, and other foreign influenced activities, and trans-national organized crime (CSIS 2003, 2004).

The difference in the portraits painted by the White Paper and the CSIS reports, the latter being much more precise, can probably be attributed to the fact that

the White Paper is a political document which was expected to filter down to the public at large. The CSIS report instead, even if public, was addressed to a very specialized audience and thus was expected to have limited political repercussions. Hence, it could afford to be starker and more precise. The impression given by the White Paper is that its list of threats, much like that of core national interests, has been crafted to reassure everyone and the US in particular. Indeed, as hinted at in the title and stated explicitly in the executive summary, the policy has been ‘crafted to balance the needs for national security and economic prosperity with the protection of core Canadian values of openness, diversity and respect for civil liberties’ (Privy Council Office 2004: vii). On the one hand, the White Paper recognizes the need to take security initiatives that would reassure the US of the safety of its northern border and thus ensure the smooth flow of goods and people across it, which in turn protects the inflow of direct investments into Canada. On the other hand, it is careful not to characterize its new security measures as the beginning of a process of further integration with the US, as advocated by some business sectors (Barry 2003; Goldfarb 2003), in order not to upset those Canadians who regard the protection of civil liberties, even in the event of security emergencies, as a Canadian core value to be defended at all costs (e.g. Jackson 2003: 26).

Neither the White Paper nor the CSIS reports mention directly the threat that the government regards as the most serious, namely the possibility that Canadian access to the US market might be hampered or diminished. Such a threat is however mentioned explicitly in the so-called ‘international policy statement’ released in April 2005. The statement devoted to ‘commerce’ points out that ‘a major terrorist incident within one of our continental partners could have direct and potential devastating consequences for the movement of people and commerce within the North American space’. It also warns against the peril of ‘complacency’ by pointing out that ‘while some Canadians may feel relatively immune to such [terrorist] dangers, in truth we are not’ (Government of Canada 2005: 7). The statement devoted to ‘defence’ focuses on three threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and what it calls ‘hot-points’, namely protracted localized conflicts that could however easily spread (e.g. China-Taiwan, Pakistan-India, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and North-Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship). Unlike the White Paper, the statement on defence also devotes considerable attention to the types of operations the Armed Forces might be expected to conduct. These are defined as ‘integrated operations’, which include not only

traditional peacekeeping, observer and humanitarian assistance missions but also combat operations (as in Kosovo or Afghanistan), complex peace support and stabilization missions (as in Bosnia or Afghanistan), and maritime interdiction operations, especially as part of the campaign against terrorism (Government of Canada, 2005: 28). The Canadian government's 'official' perception of threat can thus be summarised as shown in Table 2.2.

III. PERCEIVED SECURITY THREATS: ELITE VIEWS

Methodology. The survey of Canadian security elites was administered in two rounds in June and November 2006. Because the goal of our survey was to identify people with specialized knowledge, the sampling strategy was purposive in overall design. For the first round, we composed three separate lists of political (federal), bureaucratic, and academic experts in the security field. The study population consisted of 136 individuals: 77 members of the House of Commons and Senate, including the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the leaders of the Opposition parties and members of parliamentary committees with security, defence, or foreign affairs remits; 22 senior civil servants from the Departments of Citizenship and Immigration, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, National Defence, and the Canada Border Services Agency; and 37 security experts based at Canadian universities. In June 2006, these individuals received an electronic request to complete an anonymous, online questionnaire. In keeping with recommended social research practises, three follow-up email contacts were made following the initial contact in order to persuade prospective respondents to participate in the survey (Dillman 2000: 177). The four contacts yielded a total of nineteen completed or partially completed questionnaires. In order to boost response rates, follow-up telephone calls were placed to the offices of political and bureaucratic elites in August and September 2006. The follow-up generated an additional six responses to bring the total number of questionnaires available for analysis to 25, for a response rate of 18.4 per cent. However, since nine respondents did not identify their occupation, the number of usable questionnaires was reduced to 16, for a completed response rate of 11.8 per cent.

A second round of the survey was administered in November 2006. The study population was expanded to include: associate members of parliamentary committees

with a security remit; other senior and mid-level civil servants from the previously-contacted departments; senior and mid-level civil servants from other departments and agencies with responsibilities for addressing security challenges⁴ and university-based academics who specialize in foreign and security policies. Since members of the political and bureaucratic elites likely receive numerous electronic messages each day, and/or some of these messages may have been vetted by ‘gatekeepers’ (administrative or political assistants), we decided to administer the second round of the survey by mail. Although more costly than online distribution methods, mail distribution methods share the advantage of covering many respondents who are distributed across a large geographic area. Mail surveys are also in keeping with a broader societal trend that has seen many activities that once required interaction between people, now being shifted to a self-administration mode (Dillman 2000: 7). The mail-out package included the questionnaire, a letter of introduction explaining the purpose of the study, and a consent form outlining the voluntary nature of participation in the study (see Appendix 1). In order to facilitate returns, we included a self-addressed, stamped return envelope in the mail-out package (Dillman 2000: 18). A total of 1,204 packages were mailed to 921 civil servants, 166 politicians, and 117 academics. Due to time and financial constraints, no follow-ups were conducted.⁵ An additional 77 valid questionnaires were received (47 civil servants, 20 academics, 10 parliamentarians) for a second round return rate of 6.4 per cent. The overall response rate for both rounds was 6.9 per cent, based on 93 returns out of 1,340 requests for participation. Five questionnaires were received following December 25, 2006, and are not included in this analysis.

Compared to other elite surveys, the response rate for the security expert survey was very low. A November 2005 online survey of American opinion leaders about the state of the world and the US global role yielded response rates of 60 per

4 Environment Canada, Health Canada, Justice Canada, Fisheries and Oceans, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, Canadian Environment Assessment Agency, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Canadian Transportation Agency, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Immigration and Refugee Board, National Energy Board, National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, Public Health Agency of Canada, and the Privy Council Office.

5 Dillman (2000: 177) argues that without follow-up contacts, response rates will usually be 20-40 percentage points lower than those normally attained.

cent for academic and think tank leaders, and 52 per cent for state and local government politicians. Telephone response rates were 40 and 48 per cent for the academic and state/local opinion leader sub-samples, respectively (Pew Research 2005). In Canada, a 1992 mail survey of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the House of Commons produced a response rate of 37 per cent, and a 1993 survey of non-incumbent candidates running in the 1993 election yielded a response rate of just over 28 per cent (Docherty 1997). Since we do not know whether non-respondents differ from the respondents in a way that is relevant to the study, there is the possibility of non-response error (Dillman 2000: 11; Babbie 2001: 256).

Several factors may account for the low participation rates, particularly the sensitive nature of information about security perceptions (some who declined to participate wrote that their opinions were based on confidential information), a lack of knowledge about some of the specialized questionnaire items (indicated by some respondents), and the overall decline in survey participation rates that has been observed since the early 1990s. Despite the low response rates, the mail distribution method proved to be a more effective way of reaching parliamentarians. While the online survey and email reminders yielded no responses from parliamentarians, the mail-out generated ten responses from parliamentarians, for a 6 per cent response rate. This allowed us to achieve our target minimum of 15 responses from security specialists in the parliamentary ranks. Web-based methods were the most effective way of reaching academics. Their response rate to the online questionnaire was 27 per cent, but just 17.1 per cent for the mail-out. These observations highlight the importance of employing mixed survey distribution modes (web, phone, mail) and tailoring these methods to reach different target groups.

The low response rates for the civil servant and parliamentarian sub-samples (see Appendix 1) mean that the results cannot be considered representative of elites from these groups. A comparison of the population and sample descriptives reported in Appendix 1⁶ shows that the age distributions of the civil servant and parliamentarian sub-samples are similar to the age distributions in their corresponding populations. Females in our security expert and parliamentarian sub-samples are also represented in numbers corresponding with their presence in the study population. However, females are underrepresented in the civil servant sub-sample and males are

⁶ Calculations based on 89 cases i.e. excluding the five responses received after 25 December 2006.

underrepresented in the parliamentary sub-sample. There is also a partisan bias in the parliamentary sub-sample. The Liberals are overrepresented and the Conservatives and Bloc Québécois are underrepresented (Appendix 1). Having raised these cautions about the representativeness of the civil servant and parliamentary sub-samples, purposive sampling designs are primarily designed for comparative purposes (Babbie 2000: 179), and thus, the results can be used to compare the attitudes expressed by members of the different occupational groups.

III. SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Canadian elites were asked to rank order five of the gravest threats facing the country in 2006 and 2010, with '1' indicating the most grave and '5' the least. Natural disasters/pandemics (e.g. avian flu, HIV, SARS, influenza), man-made environmental threats (e.g. global warming, over-consumption, air pollution, heavy industry, agriculture) and terrorist strikes against critical infrastructure and state or society were the most frequently-mentioned challenges facing Canada in 2006, and were assigned the highest average rankings (Table 2.3).

The concern with natural disasters/pandemics is probably connected to the lingering memory of an outbreak of SARS in the greater Toronto area in April 2003 and to periodical reports of avian flu cases. Indeed, an Ipsos Reid poll conducted in March 2006 showed that 60 per cent of Canadians were concerned (15per cent very and 45per cent somewhat) about avian flu.⁷ The prominence of man-made environmental threats may be attributed to Canada's northern geographic position which makes it a frontline witness to the impact of climate change on the natural world. Retreating glaciers, the collapse of ancient ice shelves into the Arctic Sea, and the reduction and thinning of polar bear stocks, are just a few of the visible outcomes of rapid temperature change in this country. Although Canada was a signatory to the Kyoto protocol which tried to get the industrialized world's big polluters to commit themselves to cutting greenhouse emissions to 1990 levels or below, Canada will not meet its target. The Harper government has said that it intends to pull Canada out of Kyoto, and has chosen instead to introduce legislation that focuses on improving air quality. The proposed Clean Air Act, introduced in the fall of 2006, has generated

⁷ '6 in 10 Canadians concerned with potential bird flu outbreak', <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

strong criticism from the opposition parties, the scientific community, and the public, and guarantees that climate change will dominate public discourse in the near-term (Greenspon 2007). Natural or man-made disasters and pandemics were less prominent in the 2004 governmental White Paper, i.e. they were mentioned only towards the end of the list. The position of any given threat on the list, however, did not imply its rank order in terms of either gravity or immediacy and the fact that terrorism was mentioned first reflected the fact that the major reason for the publication of the White Paper was to reassure the US about Canadian awareness of, and preparedness to counter, such a threat. Concern with the environment seems to be widespread also among the Canadian public. Two different Ipsos Reid polls taken in October and November 2006 revealed that 57 per cent of Canadians were either ‘extremely’ (17per cent) or ‘definitely’ (40per cent) concerned about climate change. 66 per cent also believed warmer climate to be the result of man-made gasses trapped in the atmosphere and 52 per cent, were in favour (24per cent strongly) of putting a special carbon tax to increase the cost of burning fossil fuels for both consumers and industry’. At 26 per cent, the environment topped the list of issues Canadians felt should receive the greatest attention from the government.⁸

The concern with terrorism of the Canadian bureaucratic, parliamentary and academic elite corresponds with the main threat identified by the 2003 and 2004-2005 CSIS reports and is shared also by the public at large among which it is actually becoming more widespread. In July 2002, according to a Pollara survey, only 14 per cent of Canadians believed that a terrorist attack could happen in Canada and if it did it would be because of Canadian eagerness to cooperate with the US. In August 2005, a *Globe and Mail* and *CTV News* poll revealed that An August 2005 *Globe and Mail* and a CTV poll revealed that 62 per cent of Canadians now believed that a terrorist act was likely to happen in Canada, 67 per cent believed that Canada was not well prepared to deal with a terrorist threat, 62 per cent supported giving the US information about Canadian citizens suspected of being terrorists, and 81 per cent favoured deporting or jailing anyone who publicly support terrorists or suicide bombers.⁹ Less than one year later (June 2006), the percentage of Canadians who

8 ‘Environment tops the list of priorities for Canadians’ and ‘Canadians concerned about climate change’ <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

9 ‘Canadians want strict security, polls finds’, *Globe and Mail*, 11 August 2005.

believed that an act of terrorism was likely to occur in Canada had further increased to 71 per cent.¹⁰ Most Canadians, moreover, also disagree with the opinion of a vociferous minority which charges that anti-terrorist measures have gone too far in compromising individual rights. An EKO public opinion poll taken in February 2005, revealed that 50 per cent of Canadians felt the measures taken by the government had struck the right balance, 41 per cent believed that the government should go even further, while only 7 per cent thought the measures taken were excessive.¹¹ Furthermore, according to the results of a November 2006 poll conducted by the Surveillance Project at Queen's University, only 48 per cent of Canadians, against 57 per cent of US citizens, found surveillance laws intrusive.¹²

Such a change in public perception is only in part and only in the beginning attributable to the impact that Canada's geographic proximity to the US has had on the public policy priorities of the former Liberal governments under Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin, and on the current Conservative government. In the wake of 9/11, the Chrétien government undertook a series of initiatives to strengthen Canada's approach to fighting terrorism and ensuring public security. These included: the Smart Border Agreement to increase border security while maintaining the smooth flow of trade and people across the Canada-US frontier; the Anti-Terrorism Act; the Public Safety Act to strengthen civil aviation and marine security and to facilitate the sharing of law enforcement and national security information within the country and with Canada's international partners; and a direct military contribution to the US-led campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It also modified its immigration and refugee legislation to place more emphasis on identifying and deporting perceived security risks, and set up a new federal department devoted to security, and allocated more financial resources to paying for enhanced policing and intelligence (Crocchi and Verdun 2007). The bolder approach taken by the Liberal government in the 2005 'international policy statement' to analyse the threats Canada faces and describe the policies necessary to counter them followed rather than preceded the change in public

10 Pollara, 'Canadians lose fear of terrorism' <http://www.pollara.ca/library/news/terrorsubsiding.html>; 'Canadians want strict security, poll finds', *Globe and Mail*, 11 August 2005; 'Majority believe terrorists will hit Canada', *Globe and Mail*, 10 June 2006.

11 'Anti-terrorism law effective as it is, McLellan insists', *Globe and Mail*, 15 February 2005.

12 'More Americans than Canadians (almost half) find anti-terrorism laws intrusive – Queen's International Surveillance Survey finds', <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

attitude.¹³ The election of a new Conservative government in January 2006 has however increased the profile of terrorism as a perceived security threat. In the spring of 2006, Parliament agreed to commit Canadian troops to combat and reconstruction duties in Afghanistan until 2009. The expectation that terrorist attacks against state or society will continue to pose a threat to Canadian security in 2010 possibly also reflects pessimism, exacerbated by the arrests of several alleged Islamic terrorism plotters in the Toronto area in June 2006, the strong resistance that the Taliban supported by elements of Pakistani government and society are posing to Canadian troops based in southern Afghanistan, and by the difficulties faced by the American-led coalition in putting an end to sectarian conflicts and establishing order in Iraq. With respect to home-bred terrorism, for instance, 58 per cent of Canadians felt that the Toronto plotters might have been only ‘the tip of iceberg’ and that many more terrorist groups exist and are ready to strike in Canada.¹⁴

Conventional war, nuclear/radiological attacks and migratory pressures were the least frequently mentioned issues, with migratory pressures assigned the lowest average ranking (Table 2.3). Canada’s geographic position puts it pretty much beyond the reach of a conventional attack and its proximity to the US is a further deterrent for any would-be nuclear/radiological attacker. Canada has a relatively large and uncontroversial immigration programme hence migratory pressures relate primarily to refugee seekers, which in the 1990s represented only a small percentage (about 15 per cent) of all newcomers (Gallagher 2002: 98-9 and 113-15). Canada, moreover, signed a Safe Third Country Agreement with the US at the end of 2004, which means that refugee claimants at a land port of entry along the Canada-U.S. border must ask for protection in whichever of the two countries they entered first. This means, for instance, that most claimants from Central and South America who have travelled through the US cannot now access the Canadian refugee determination process. Citizenship and Immigration Canada estimates the Agreement may have contributed to the 55 per cent decline in the number of ‘in-country refugees’ from 2004 to 2005 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2006). Finally, ten respondents prioritized

13 One analyst, moreover, has argued that the innovative character of the ‘international policy statement’ is primarily a reflection of the fact that it was written by external consultants (Michaud 2005).

14 ‘Canadians react in wake of terror-plot arrests’ <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

‘other’ issues that were not offered as choices in the questionnaire.¹⁵

When respondents were asked what they felt would constitute the most important threats facing Canada in 2010, natural disasters/pandemics, man-made environmental disasters, and both forms of terrorism were mentioned most frequently (Table 2.3). However, the rank order of threats changed slightly between 2006 and 2010. Natural disasters and man-made environmental threats received the highest average rankings in the 2.27-2.5 range, but criminalisation of the economy received the third highest average ranking (2.67) and macroeconomic instability the fourth highest (2.73). Meanwhile, the average rankings given to both forms of terrorist threats in 2010 slipped slightly. When respondents ranked the same issue area in both 2006 and 2010, they exhibited consistency in their threat perceptions. This is shown by the strong magnitude of many of the Pearson-r correlations, which measure how variables or rank orders are related (Table 2.3).

There was a substantial amount of elite consensus about the gravest security threats facing Canada (Table 2.3). Civil servants, parliamentarians, and bureaucrats assigned very similar rankings to higher profile issues such as terrorism and man-made environmental threats. Statistically significant inter-group differences in threat perceptions were detected for just two issues in 2006 and two issues in 2010. Parliamentarians assigned higher average rankings to biological/chemical attacks and migratory pressures in 2006 than members of the bureaucratic and academic elites (although it should be noted that the parliamentarian average for migratory pressures is based on just one case). Civil servants were more likely than security experts and parliamentarians to forecast that cyber attacks and nuclear/radiological attacks would constitute graver threats to Canadian security in 2010.

IV. POLICY INSTRUMENTS

Police cooperation/intelligence sharing and economic and financial assistance were the most frequently-mentioned policy instruments for dealing with security threats (Tables 4a-d). Economic and financial assistance were the most popular choices in

¹⁵ One individual felt that the violence and instability associated with the Israeli-Palestinian question posed the gravest threat, and that poverty and agricultural protectionism in the developed world were potential sources of instability and migratory pressures. International challenges that were mentioned by other respondents included: US aggression (sic!), US domination of the Canadian economy, Arctic sovereignty, and emerging economies.

five issue areas: ethnic conflict; macroeconomic instability; migratory pressures; man-made environmental threats; and natural disasters/pandemics. Police cooperation and intelligence sharing were the most commonly-cited approaches for dealing with seven issue areas including: biological/chemical attacks; nuclear/radiological attacks; terrorist attacks against state or society; terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure; the criminalisation of the economy; cyber attacks; and narcotics trafficking. While very few identified conventional war as one of the five security threats, diplomacy was the preferred instrument for dealing with this challenge (Table 2.4a).

The preference for police cooperation/intelligence sharing suggests an awareness of the trans-national nature of security challenges and a recognition that the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 9/11 occurred in part as a result of the failure of intelligence agencies in the US to share information with each other (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004). Improved police intelligence and a reliance on informants contributed to the break-up of alleged terrorist plots in the United Kingdom and Canada in 2006. These high-profile operations may have contributed to a greater appreciation of this approach. The prominence of economic/financial assistance is most probably linked to the image that Canadians have of their country's role in international affairs. According to an October 2005 Ipsos Reid poll, 54 per cent of Canadians are of the opinion that Canada should give priority to 'helping to reduce hunger and poverty around the world'. Fully 85 per cent of them, moreover, believe (44per cent strongly) that Canada is indeed a very generous country when it comes to giving aid to poorer countries.¹⁶ Our survey respondents rarely identified traditional military solutions as their preferred policy instruments. Instead, there was a tendency to prefer special operations to deal with both forms of terrorism, biological/chemical attacks, and nuclear/radiological attacks. The aversion to traditional military solutions may reflect Canada's conception of itself as 'international mediator' and the inventor and main proponent of international peacekeeping. In the 1970s and 1980s, Canada participated in every UN peacekeeping mission and provided as much as 10 per cent of its military forces, which made it the largest contributor. Although this is no longer the case, the image of Canada as the world peacekeeper endures (Gotlieb 2005: 23), which also explains why a majority of Canadians felt and feel that the Chrétien government's decision not to commit Canadian troops to Iraq was the right thing to

¹⁶ 'Canadian Views on Canada's Role in International Affairs', <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

do.¹⁷ Briefly, all three subsets of Canadian security elites share the same opinions concerning the choice of policy instruments and they seem - we say 'seem' because the data available for the Canadian public provide only indirect evidence - to mirror those of the public at large.

Diplomatic solutions constituted a plurality of responses in the conventional war category only (Table 2.4a). The failure of this instrument to emerge as a preferred policy instrument in other issue areas might seem surprising given Canada's traditional preference for diplomacy within multilateral institutions. Elites, however, seem to recognize that diplomatic means are ineffective when dealing with an enemy that does not negotiate and hence does not respond to sticks and carrots, and is motivated primarily by religious fervour.

Canadian elites frequently proposed other policy instruments to deal with man-made environmental threats and natural disasters/pandemics. For the former issue, these solutions included national environmental laws, policies and regulations, the implementation of the Kyoto accord, environmental cooperation, changing consumption habits/lifestyle changes, public awareness, and for the latter security challenge this included medical aid and cooperation, disaster relief plans, emergency preparedness, research and development, and a national public health program. Although evidence concerning the policy preferences of the public is scarcer and more indirect, what is available indicates that Canadians are ready to take an even more robust approach. For what concerns the environment, a survey conducted in January 2007, shows that a majority of Canadians (62 per cent) would be willing to have the economy grow at a 'significantly slower rate' to reduce global warming.¹⁸ In the case of pandemics, 91 per cent of Canadians support (50 per cent strongly and 41 per cent somewhat) court-ordered quarantines for those exposed to the flu and 86 per cent support the idea that criminal charges be laid against those violating the quarantine.¹⁹

Compared to civil servants and security experts, parliamentarians were less enthusiastic about diplomatic and economic/financial solutions to address a majority

17 According to various Ipsos Reid polls, the percentage of Canadians approving Chrétien's decision has hovered around the 70 per cent mark <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

18 For an analysis of the results of the January 2007 Globe and Mail/CTV News environment poll see *The Globe and Mail*, 27 January 2007, p. A6-A7 and 29 January 2007, p. A4.

19 '6 in 10 Canadians concerned with potential bird flu outbreak', <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

of security challenges, while academic experts selected police cooperation/intelligence sharing solutions more often than members of other elite groups (Tables 4a-d). Civil servants were relatively more disposed towards using police cooperation/intelligence sharing and special operations instruments to deal with terrorism (Table 2.4d). Overall, just three statistically significant differences between the occupational groups were detected, although this also reflects the small size of many of the cells. Security experts were significantly more likely than parliamentarians and bureaucrats to: identify other solutions to deal with man-made environmental threats (Table 2.4d) and to propose diplomatic solutions to deal with macroeconomic instability (Table 2.4c). Civil servants were significantly more likely than academics and parliamentarians to name special operations as the best instrument to respond to natural disasters/pandemics (Table 2.4d).

V. ORIGINS OF SECURITY THREATS

Canadian elites felt that both state/region and non-state actors were sources of security challenges. Non-state actors were mentioned more often than state actors as the sources of eight threats: biological/chemical attacks, criminalisation of the economy, cyber attacks, ethnic conflicts, man-made environmental disasters, narcotics trafficking, terrorist attacks against state or society, and terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure. States/regions were more frequently blamed for six issue areas: conventional war, macroeconomic instability, migratory pressures, natural disasters/pandemics, nuclear/radiological attacks, and other issues (e.g. US aggression/domination, poverty, Arctic sovereignty, emerging economies, poverty, political instability, and inadequate health care).²⁰

Civil servants were more likely than others to identify state/regional actors as the source of eight of 14 security threats (Table 2.5a), and security experts were more likely to pinpoint non-state actors as the source of eight challenges (Table 2.5b). Bearing in mind the initially small sample size of parliamentarians, members of the three occupational groups tended to agree about the origins of security threats. Statistically significant inter-group differences were found in just three instances.

²⁰ Albeit defined in a variety of ways, Islamic terrorist groups were the non-state actor most mentioned as a source of threat. The Middle East or Arab countries, China, and East Asia, were the states or regions most-often mentioned.

Between 46 and 50 per cent of civil servants and security experts identified states/regions as the sources of natural disasters/pandemics, compared to about 13 per cent of parliamentarians (Table 2.5a). Between 20-25 per cent of parliamentarians and academic experts named non-state actors as the source of macroeconomic instability, compared to just 2.2 per cent of civil servants (Table 2.5b). A majority of civil servants (56.5 per cent) identified non-state actors as the origin of terrorist attacks, compared to 13.3 per cent of parliamentarians (Table 2.5b).

VI. IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Table 2.6 presents data on elite perceptions of the European Union's (EU) importance in addressing the security threats currently facing the continent. On a 0-5 scale where 0 = not important at all and 5 = absolutely essential, they judged the EU to be of moderate importance, with average responses for each issue area ranging from lows of 2.62 and 2.68 for conventional war and nuclear/radiological attacks to highs of 3.59 for macroeconomic instability and 3.43 for migratory pressures. Although each issue area drew a wide range of responses on the 0-5 scale, the standard deviations were not large, suggesting there is an elite consensus that EU involvement was of some importance, but not absolutely essential. The relatively higher score for the ability of the EU to deal with macroeconomic instability most likely reflects the fact that in Canada the EU is perceived primarily as a large market and an economic actor.

Civil servants and security experts expressed the most faith in EU capacity to deal with macroeconomic instability and migratory pressures, while the parliamentarians felt that the institution was best equipped to address narcotics trafficking and terrorism against critical infrastructure. Both forms of terrorist attacks were the only security challenges that resulted in a significant difference of opinion between elite groups. In both cases, civil servants and parliamentarians felt the EU was of moderate importance in addressing these threats, while the security experts felt that its capacity was closer to being nonessential. This might come as a surprise to EU specialists who have followed closely the slow birth and development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and concluded that the EU has gone rather far in this new direction. Although this is undoubtedly true, for Canadian security specialists - who by and large still subscribe to the view that security in the West, Europe included, is a business of NATO - from an operational point of view the EU has still limited competences in the security field,

its hard power is at best symbolic of its intention to become a significant actor in this field while its much-touted soft power has yet to prove significant, let alone decisive, in countering terrorist threats.

VII. NATIONAL DEFENCE BUDGETS

Canadian elites were asked to comment on the size and distribution of budgetary and manpower resources devoted to meeting security and national defence needs. The December 2001 budget provided C\$ 7.7 billion over five years to enhance Canadian security. This amount included the money necessary to maintain existing public safety and policing programmes. Only part of it was designed to respond directly to the increased need for security after 9/11. The new funds were to be spent primarily to upgrade intelligence equipment, deploy more frontline investigative personnel, expand the anti-terrorism capacity of the military, improve critical infrastructure protection, enhance border and marine security, and create a new air security organization. It should be noted, however, that in the case of CSIS, for instance, the new funding simply restores operating budgets and number of employees to the mid-1990s levels (CSIS 2003: Fig. 1 and 2). Table 2.7 provides a summary and breakdown of the special security related budgetary allocations after 9/11. The December 2001 budget disregarded the needs of the Canadian military despite repeated, undeniable demonstrations of its decline (Granatstein 2004). At the end of World War II, Canada had the fourth most powerful military in the world on which it spent 7.3 per cent of GDP (Gotlieb 2005: 23). In the year 2000, Canada ranked last (if one excludes tiny Luxembourg) among NATO countries in terms of defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP (1.2 per cent). As shown in Table 2.8, defence expenditures had basically remained the same (about C\$ 13 billion per year) since the early 1990s. The same was true for the number of armed forces (both military and civilian personnel) as a percentage of national labour force (King 2002). Inevitably, the role played by Canada in international peacekeeping had also become marginal. Having invented it, as it were, peacekeeping soon became part of Canada's international identity. For two decades - in the 1970s and 1980s - Canada participated in every UN peacekeeping mission and provided as much as 10 per cent of its military forces, which made it the largest contributor. Today, Canada provides only about 0.9 per cent of all UN peacekeeping forces, which places it 32nd in the ranks of contributors (Gotlieb 2005: 23). As shown in Table 2.8, the Canadian military received a modest new allocation

of C\$ 270 million for Operation Apollo in Afghanistan in 2003 and another C\$ 800 million in 2004, but had to wait until 2005 for a much-needed financial injection of C\$ 12.8 billion, which will be spent, however, mainly between 2008 and 2010. At that time, the military budget will amount to C\$ 19 billion. Most of the money is designed to replace ageing equipment and increasing the number of troops from the current level of 62,000 to 67,000.²¹

Perceptions of the size and distribution of national defence budgets. As shown in Table 2.9, more than 65 per cent of the respondents felt that the country's budgetary and manpower resources were misaligned with the threats facing Canada, with civil servants and security experts expressing the most dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction with the size and distribution of national defence budgets was also evident (Table 2.10). A bare majority of respondents indicated the defence budget is too small, and more than 68 per cent said that the distribution of budgetary resources does not meet Canada's needs. In both cases, civil servants and security experts expressed more relative dissatisfaction with the size and distribution of the national defence budget than parliamentarians. Overall, 53.5 per cent of respondents felt that too little had been spent on military modernisation, compared to 40.7 per cent who were satisfied with spending in this area (Table 2.10). A majority of civil servants and academic experts felt the allocation was too little, while a majority of parliamentarians said it was just about right. The fact that parliamentarians were much less likely to express dissatisfaction with the size and distribution of the budget is probably due to the fact that the Liberals – i.e. the governing party responsible for passing the budgets examined here – were overrepresented in our parliamentary sub-sample.

When probed further about their opinions about spending on personnel, procurement and research and development within national defence budgets, between 66 and 76 per cent of respondents said that too little was being spent on personnel, procurement and research and development, with security experts and civil servants again expressing more dissatisfaction with the distribution of defence budget spending (Table 2.11). The responses likely reveal concerns about the age and safety of equipment following a long period of cuts to the military under Liberal governments during the 1990s, and possibly, growing concerns about whether adequate support has

²¹ 'Ailing Forces get big boost' *National Post*, 24 February 2005.

been provided to Canadian troops in Afghanistan. Interestingly, the parliamentarians who expressed satisfaction with the size and distribution of defence budgets, and the amount of funds devoted to military modernisation (Table 2.10), were of the opinion that too little has been spent on personnel and research and development (Table 2.11).

VIII. ESDP, NATO AND THE US

Just over 37 per cent of respondents were undecided about whether a more autonomous ESDP would weaken NATO (Table 2.12). When an opinion was provided, a plurality (43.4 per cent) said it would weaken it some or very much. Parliamentarians were most likely to indicate they did not know what the effect of a more autonomous ESDP would be, while security experts were more likely to feel that it could weaken NATO some or very much (Table 2.12). The high percentage of ‘don’t know’ responses among parliamentarians and, to a lesser extent, civil servants might be an indication of the relatively limited knowledge of highly specialised EU policies, such as ESDP, among Canadians in general. Among those who are familiar with it, perceptions of the ESDP-NATO relationship seem to reflect the split that on this issue exists in Europe itself as well as the US, namely whether ESDP should represent a strengthened European contribution to NATO or become an alternative to it.

Considerable uncertainty also characterized perceptions about whether a weaker NATO would lead to a retrenchment of the US commitment to European security. Almost half of those surveyed responded ‘maybe’ or ‘do not know’ (Table 2.12). When a clear opinion was expressed, 31.8 per cent said ‘yes’ and 19.3 per cent said ‘no’. Not surprisingly, security experts were most likely to have an opinion on this matter, with their opinions skewed towards ‘yes’. Only about one fifth of respondents, in each of the elite groups and hence also overall, felt that the American commitment to European security was ‘inessential’ or ‘not very important’, with the median response being ‘important’ (Table 2.12). Very similar proportions of civil servants and security experts (about 43-45 per cent) felt that it was ‘important’ or ‘essential/very important’, compared to just a third of parliamentarians.

IX. CONCEPTIONS OF INTERSTATE ACTIONS AND SECURITY APPROACHES

When asked to indicate on a scale of 0-10 which pattern of interstate interaction best

described how Canada is meeting its security challenges, with 0 = solely unilateral and 10 = always multilateral, the mean overall response of 7.54 indicates that elite opinions tend toward the multilateral approach which is in keeping with Canada's historical self-image (Table 2.13). When asked about whether the government conceives of security narrowly, where hard power is required, or broadly, where soft power is required, the average response of 6.60 was placed closer to the soft power end of the continuum (Table 2.13). While the typical response leans toward soft power, it is not decisively in that camp.

The absence of statistically significant occupational group differences in mean evaluations, and the presence of no unusually large standard deviations, indicates overall consensus about Canada's patterns of interstate actions and security approaches. There was slightly more elite disagreement about Canada's patterns of interaction with other states, possibly reflecting the need acknowledged governmental initiatives after 9/11 to counter security threats bilaterally i.e. through close cooperation with the US.

It should also be pointed out that two respondents questioned the phrasing and relevancy of the points on the unilateral/multilateral continuum in question 13. One respondent crossed out the mid-point 'strictly bilateral' and the endpoint 'always multilateral', and replaced these labels with 'sometimes bilateral' and 'sometimes multilateral', respectively. Another respondent checked both 'strictly bilateral' and 'always multilateral' for question 13 and added the remarks '[it] depends'. Although for these two questionnaires no response was recorded for question 13, the two comments invite a clarification. Although some Canadians might indeed believe, as official rhetoric would have it, that a 'multilateral' gene is at the heart of the DNA of the Canadian state, things are more complex than that. As pointed out by Canada's experts on the subject (Keating 2002; Harvey 2004), multilateralism does not imply a pursuit of international community-wide interests to the detriment of national interests. More often than not, especially in the case of medium-sized powers, national and multilateral interests simply tend to coincide. If, and when, the two diverge, national interests prevail. And indeed, as Keating (2002: 1) points out, Canadian bilateral relations with the US have always represented a 'noteworthy exception' to Canadian multilateralism, which means that when necessary, as has been the case after 9/11, Canadian governments have paid less attention to action within multilateral organizations and considerably more to bilateral relations with its

southern neighbour.

Continental Security Perimeter: After 9/11, some Canadian economic and political elites have advocated a foreign policy grounded in a conception of national interest that explicitly recognizes the central role of the US in assuring Canadian national security and economic prosperity. Hence, the proposal of creating what has been defined a 'continental security perimeter' (CSP) or 'area of mutual confidence'. For this reason, we added a question to the November 2006 mail-out of the questionnaire that tapped into respondents' opinions about the controversial proposal. Just five of the 72 individuals who responded to this round of the survey indicated that they did not know. Of the remaining 67 respondents, 55.2 per cent were 'strongly in favour' or 'in favour', and 44.8 per cent were 'opposed' or 'strongly opposed' (Table 2.14). No statistically significant differences were detected between the occupational groups (Table 2.14).

Respondents were invited to elaborate on their answers in an open-ended, follow-up question. Their explanations were varied and detailed, but for the purposes of this paper, they will be described in broad strokes. Support for the CSP was based on four distinct rationales linked to voice, economic prosperity, efficiency, and effectiveness. More specifically, some felt it would be in Canada's interests to have a seat at the table rather than watch the US pursue unilateral action. Some of these respondents pointed to existing examples of cooperation that have given Canada a voice on defence and security matters such as NORAD. Others feel that cooperation with the US would protect against border closures and threats to Canada's prosperity, and improve the bilateral trade relationship by assuaging US concerns about our security efforts. Efficiency was also mentioned as a reason for promoting closer North American integration, with some mentioning the need to utilize better scarce resources, to address the redundancies of border controls and regulations that inhibit North American competitiveness, to avoid duplication in efforts, and to derive benefits from economies of scale. Finally, respondents argued the CSP would improve the effectiveness of existing efforts because security threats do not respect boundaries and the Canada-US border is too long to protect. Several people felt there was a lack of coordination and information sharing between NAFTA countries, and that a security perimeter could strengthen existing cooperation and bring security benefits to Mexico. One individual mentioned China as a new threat that will require a strong defence.

Opposition to the CSP is anchored around concerns about policy harmonization to US practises, weakened Canadian sovereignty, policy ineffectiveness, and costs. More specifically, many respondents expected that the CSP would lead to a harmonization to US practises (e.g.: ‘US policies are misguided and dangerous’), to the domination of American priorities (e.g. ‘it would make Canadian participation in the missile defence system necessary’, emphasis on ‘hard power’ approaches), and to a weakening of multilateral options and of Canada’s international prestige and interests. The protection of Canadian sovereignty was also a concern as several individuals expressed the need for an independent foreign policy especially in order to protect individual freedoms for Canadian citizens. Several individuals felt that the CSP would be ineffective because it is too difficult to defend extensive borders or the perimeter against non-state actors. A handful of respondents mused that Canada’s security interests are best promoted by tackling root causes, underlying misconceptions, and misinformation through diplomacy, investment in development, knowledge and understanding. A few felt that the proposal would be too costly because it would require Canadian participation in a missile defence system, provide no additional security, and fail to address other problems such as poverty and environmental disasters. Overall, the opinions of Canadian security elites on the establishing of a CPS mirror the polarization that exists within Canadian society at large (Crocchi and Verdun 2007: 142-143).

X. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has analysed the threat perceptions of Canadian political, bureaucratic and academic security elite and has compared them with those articulated by the Canadian government and, when data were available, those of the Canadian public at large. Overall, the government, public opinion and security elite seem to agree on the type of threats they perceive as facing Canadians after 9/11. Since then, both Islamic terrorism and the deterioration of the environment have acquired prominence. The environment, moreover, has also become a hot political issue exploited by both government and opposition in their ongoing competition. For what concerns terrorism, the events of 9/11 led the government to take a more proactive approach to national security, namely to adopt new policies aimed primarily at convincing the US of the security of its northern border. At the same time, however, the government eschewed what perceived to be more potentially controversial choices, such as

participating in the 'coalition of the willing' in Iraq or joining the ballistic missile defence project. Concern with security, in other words, went hand in hand with desire to maintain 'distinction'. The 2004 White Paper on security reflected this approach. It was only after it became clear that public opinion was increasingly preoccupied with the terrorist threat and well disposed towards the adoption of tighter security measures that the government adopted a less circumspect approach as reflected in the 2005 'international policy statement'. The Liberal governments, in other words, followed rather than led public opinion in its approach to security.

Substantial agreements among security elites exists for what concerns the choice of policy instruments, especially the usage of police cooperation/intelligence sharing and economic and financial assistance and the relative inefficacy of diplomacy to deal with the threat of terrorism. Canadian elite seem also more disposed to regard multilateralism less as part of Canadian international identity and more as a policy tool that might work, and hence be useful, in some cases but not in others. For what concerns the budget, parliamentarians were much more likely to be satisfied with it and its distribution than were civil servants and security experts. This however might be primarily a reflection of the fact that Liberals, i.e. members of the governing party during the period under consideration were overrepresented in our sample.

Civil servants and parliamentarians were much less familiar with ESDP than were security experts. A majority of those who expressed an opinion, however, agreed with security experts that a more autonomous ESDP would weaken NATO and lead to a retrenchment of US commitment to European security, which a great majority of them thought was still essential or important. Interestingly, however, an absolute majority of both civil servants (59.5) and parliamentarians (55.5per cent) were either strongly in favour or in favour of the setting up of a continental security perimeter in North America. The overall split (55 per cent in favour and 45 per cent opposed) seems to reflect the division that exist also among the public at large on this issue. It is safe to conclude, however, that when it comes to security, Canadian elite are more likely to look south than across the Atlantic. These finding taken together seem to suggest that although Canadian elite will continue to support NATO, they look at it more as an arena within which they can, together with the Europeans exercise some influence on the US than as a direct provider of security.

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Table 2.1 Canadian ‘security culture’

<i>View of external environment</i>	Basic ‘liberal-internationalist’ view, i.e. belief that ‘multilateralism’ leads to a more orderly and peaceful world
<i>National identity</i>	Defined primarily in opposition to the US Perception of national role as helpful international mediator
<i>Instrumental preferences</i>	Integrated strategy: preference for civilian instruments and soft power (diplomacy, economic aid and development, promotion of human rights, and peacekeeping) but also use of armed forces (antiterrorism special operations, combat and peace support operations)
<i>Interaction preferences</i>	Devotion to multilateral institutions but much attention paid also to bilateral relations with the US given degree of economic dependence

Table 2.2 Canadian ‘official’ threat perceptions after 9/11

<i>Type of key threats</i>	Closure of US border as a result of a terrorist attack on the US Islamic terrorism Spread of weapons of mass destruction Conflicts spreading from regional ‘hot points’ Secessionists extorting funds from immigrant communities
<i>Agency of threats</i>	US anti-terrorism initiatives which slow down border crossing Activities of non-state actors i.e. terrorist and secessionist groups Failed states
<i>Target of threats</i>	Economic interests Civilian population, some immigrant communities in particular
<i>Geographical source of threats</i>	Regional ‘hot points’ International and domestic Islamic terrorist cells Domestic immigrant secessionist activists (e.g., Tamil)

Table 2.3 Mean Perceptions of Security Threats in 2006 and 2010

	Civil Servant (n=46)	Parliamentarian (n=15)	Security Expert (n=28)	Overall (n=89)	Pearson Corr. 2006/ 2010
<i>Biological/chemical</i>	3.15 (13)	2.33 (3)	4.44 (9)	3.52(25)	.81***
	3.18 (11)	2.00 (1)	4.00 (7)	3.42 (19)	
<i>Conventional war</i>	3.00(1)		2.67(3)	2.75 (4)	1.00***
			3.25(4)	3.25 (4)	
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	3.17(12)	3.25 (4)	2.5 (6)	3.00 (22)	.68***
	2.92(12)	2.67(3)	2.17(6)	2.67 (21)	
<i>Cyber attack</i>	3.5(10)	3.5(2)	3.78(9)	3.62 (21)	.32
	2.73(11)	3.75(4)	3.91(11)	3.38 (26)	
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	4.14(7)	2.33(3)	4.0(7)	3.76 (17)	.80***
	4.0(7)	2.0(2)	4.22(9)	3.89 (18)	
<i>Macroeconomic instability</i>	2.91(11)	3.5(4)	2.33(12)	2.74 (27)	.81***
	3.0(10)	3.0(4)	2.42(12)	2.73 (26)	
<i>Man-made environmental</i>	2.7(27)	2.14(7)	2.73(22)	2.64 (56)	.60***
	2.54(28)	2.38(8)	1.84(19)	2.27 (55)	
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	4.29(7)	1.00(1)	4.00(4)	3.92 (12)	.38
	4.0(7)		3.33(6)	3.69 (13)	
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	3.19(16)	3.29(7)	4.25(8)	3.48 (31)	.59**
	3.71(14)	2.60(5)	4.40(5)	3.63 (24)	
<i>Natural disasters/pandemics</i>	2.33(36)	3.50(8)	2.64(22)	2.58 (66)	.68***
	2.47(34)	3.0(6)	2.41(22)	2.50 (62)	
<i>Nuclear/radiological</i>	3.38(8)	3.00(1)	4.25(4)	3.62 (13)	.80**
	2.71(7)	3.00(1)	3.25(4)	2.92 (12)	
<i>Terrorism: critical infrastructure</i>	2.79(33)	2.56(9)	2.71(14)	2.73 (56)	.64***
	2.86(28)	1.80(5)	3.55(11)	2.91 (44)	
<i>Terrorism: state or society</i>	2.81(32)	3.0(7)	2.35(17)	2.70 (56)	.70***
	3.15(26)	3.33(3)	2.79(14)	3.05 (43)	

Notes: 2006 and 2010 means in first and second rows of each cell, respectively. Bold indicates inter-group differences are statistically significant at .05.

***p < .001; ** p < .01

Table 2.4a. Best Policy Instruments to Address Security Threats

	Civil Servant column % (n=46)	Parliamentarian column % (n=15)	Security Expert column % (n=28)	Overall column % (n=89)
Biological/chemical attacks				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	10.9 (5)	0 (0)	14.3 (4)	10.1 (9)
<i>Economic/financial assistance^a</i>	4.3 (2)	6.7 (1)	7.1 (2)	5.6 (5)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	28.3 (13)	13.3 (2)	28.6 (8)	25.8 (23)
<i>Traditional military</i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	7.9 (7)
<i>Special operations</i>	10.6 (9)	6.7 (1)	14.3 (4)	15.7 (14)
<i>Other^a</i>	4.4 (2)	0 (0)	7.2 (2)	4.5 (4)
Conventional war				
<i>Diplomatic^a</i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	7.1 (2)	3.4 (3)
<i>Economic/financial assistance^a</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	3.6 (1)	1.1 (1)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing^a</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	3.6 (1)	0 (0)
<i>Traditional military^a</i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)
<i>Special operations^a</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
<i>Other^a</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Nuclear/radiological attacks				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	7.1 (2)	6.7 (6)
<i>Economic/financial assistance^a</i>	4.3 (2)	0 (0)	3.6 (1)	3.4 (3)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	15.2 (7)	0 (0)	14.3 (4)	12.4 (11)
<i>Traditional military^a</i>	6.5 (3)	0 (0)	3.6 (1)	4.5 (4)
<i>Special operations</i>	13 (6)	0 (0)	3.6 (1)	7.9 (7)
<i>Other^a</i>	4.4 (2)	6.7 (1)	3.6 (1)	4.5 (4)

^a insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis

Table 2.4b. Best Policy Instruments to Address Security Threats

	Civil Servant column % (n=46)	Parliamentarian column % (n=15)	Security expert column % (n=28)	Overall column % (n=89)
Criminalisation of economy				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	6.5 (3)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	6.7 (6)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	6.5 (3)	6.7 (1)	10.7 (3)	7.9 (7)
<i>Police cooperation/intelligence sharing</i>	26.1 (12)	26.7 (4)	17.9 (5)	23.6 (21)
<i>Traditional military^a</i>	0 (0)	6.7 (1)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)
<i>Special operations^a</i>	8.7 (4)	6.7 (1)	0 (0)	5.6 (5)
<i>Other</i>	6.6 (3)	6.7 (1)	7.1 (2)	6.7 (6)
Cyber Attack				
<i>Diplomatic^a</i>	2.2 (1)	6.7 (1)	10.7 (3)	5.6 (5)
<i>Economic/financial assistance^a</i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	4.5 (4)
<i>Police cooperation/intelligence sharing</i>	21.7 (10)	0 (0)	28.6 (8)	20.2 (18)
<i>Traditional military^a</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
<i>Special operations</i>	8.7 (4)	13.3 (2)	0 (0)	6.7 (6)
<i>Other^a</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	14.3 (4)	4.5 (4)
Narcotics Trafficking				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	6.5 (3)	6.7 (1)	17.9 (5)	10.1 (9)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	6.5 (3)	6.7 (1)	17.9 (5)	10.1 (9)
<i>Police cooperation/intelligence sharing</i>	34.8 (16)	33.3 (5)	25 (7)	31.5 (28)
<i>Traditional military^a</i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)
<i>Special operations</i>	10.9 (5)	13.3 (2)	3.6 (1)	9 (8)
<i>Other^a</i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	4.5 (4)

^a insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis

Table 2.4c. Best Policy Instruments to Address Security Threats

	Civil Servant column % (n=46)	Parliamentarian column % (n=15)	Security expert column % (n=28)	Overall column % (n=89)
Ethnic conflict				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	4.3 (2)	6.7 (1)	14.3 (4)	7.9 (7)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	6.5 (3)	13.3 (2)	17.9 (5)	11.2 (10)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	6.5 (3)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	6.7 (6)
<i>Traditional military^a</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	14.3 (4)	4.5 (4)
<i>Special operations</i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	7.9 (7)
<i>Other</i>	8.7 (4)	6.7 (1)	7.2 (2)	7.9 (7)
Macroeconomic instability				
<i>Diplomatic**</i>	10.9 (5)	6.7 (1)	35.7 (10)	18 (16)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	19.6 (9)	26.7 (4)	39.3 (11)	27 (24)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing^a</i>	2.2 (1)	6.7 (1)	10.7 (3)	5.6 (5)
<i>Traditional military^a</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
<i>Special operations^a</i>	0 (0)	6.7 (1)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)
<i>Other</i>	4.4 (2)	13.4 (2)	21.4 (6)	11.2 (10)
Migratory pressures				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	13 (6)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	10.1 (9)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	13 (6)	0 (0)	14.3 (4)	11.2 (10)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing^a</i>	4.3 (2)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	4.5 (5)
<i>Traditional military^a</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
<i>Special operations^a</i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)
<i>Other^a</i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)

^a: insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis ; ** p < .01

Table 2.4d. Best Policy Instruments to Address Security Threats

	Civil Servant column % (n=46)	Parliamentarian column % (n=15)	Security expert column % (n=28)	Overall column % (n=89)
Man-made environmental threats				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	41.3 (19)	20 (3)	39.3 (11)	37.1 (33)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	39.1 (18)	40 (6)	46.5 (13)	41.6 (37)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	6.5 (3)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	6.7 (6)
<i>Traditional military^a</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
<i>Special operations</i>	13 (6)	13.3 (2)	3.6 (1)	10.1 (9)
<i>Other**</i>	26.1 (12)	40 (6)	60.7 (17)	39.3 (35)
Natural disasters/pandemics				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	19.6 (9)	6.7 (1)	35.7 (10)	22.5 (20)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	47.8 (22)	40 (6)	57.1 (16)	49.4 (44)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	17.4 (8)	6.7 (1)	28.6 (8)	19.1 (17)
<i>Traditional military</i>	6.5 (3)	6.7 (1)	3.6 (1)	5.6 (5)
<i>Special operations*</i>	26.1 (12)	0 (0)	7.1 (2)	15.7 (14)
<i>Other</i>	30.4 (14)	40 (6)	42.9 (12)	36 (32)
Terrorist attacks:				
Critical infrastructure				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	28.3 (13)	20 (3)	28.6 (8)	27 (24)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	19.6 (9)	6.7 (1)	14.3 (4)	15.7 (14)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	71.7 (33)	53.3 (8)	50 (14)	61.8 (55)
<i>Traditional military</i>	21.7 (10)	20 (3)	21.4 (6)	21.3 (19)
<i>Special operations</i>	47.8 (22)	33.3 (5)	35.7 (10)	41.6 (37)
<i>Other^a</i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	3.6 (1)	5.6 (5)
Terrorist attacks: state and society				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	39.1 (18)	20 (3)	32.1 (9)	33.7 (30)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	17.4 (8)	6.7 (1)	14.3 (4)	14.6 (13)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	67.4 (31)	40 (6)	60.7 (17)	60.7 (54)
<i>Traditional military</i>	17.4 (8)	20 (3)	10.7 (3)	15.7 (14)
<i>Special operations</i>	45.7 (21)	26.7 (4)	42.9 (12)	41.6 (37)
<i>Other^a</i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	3.6 (1)	5.6 (5)

^a insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis ; p * < .05; ** p < .01

**Table 2.5a. Percent Naming States and Regions
as Origins of Security Threats**

	Civil Servant column % n=46	Parliamentarian column % N=15	Security Expert column % n=28	Overall column % n=89
<i>Biological/chemical attack</i>	27.8 (10)	0 (0)	17.9 (5)	16.9 (15)
<i>Conventional war</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	7.1 (2)	2.2 (2)
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	15.2 (7)	6.7 (1)	10.7 (3)	12.4 (11)
<i>Cyber attack</i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	17.9 (5)	10.1 (9)
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	6.5 (3)	13.3 (2)	10.7 (3)	9 (8)
<i>Macroeconomic instability</i>	19.6 (9)	26.7 (4)	32.1 (9)	24.7 (22)
<i>Man-made environmental</i>	41.3 (19)	40 (6)	46.4 (13)	42.7 (38)
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	15.2 (7)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	11.2 (10)
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	23.9 (11)	0 (0)	14.3 (4)	16.9 (15)
<i>Natural disaster/pandemics*</i>	50 (23)	13.3 (2)	46.4 (13)	42.7 (38)
<i>Nuclear/radiological attacks</i>	15.2 (7)	0 (0)	7.1 (2)	10.1 (9)
<i>Terrorism: crit. infrastructure</i>	37 (17)	20 (2)	32.1 (8)	30.3 (27)
<i>Terrorism: state or society</i>	43.5 (20)	13.3 (2)	28.6 (8)	33.7 (30)
<i>Other</i>	6.5 (3)	20 (3)	7.1 (2)	9 (8)

Note: $p < .05$

Table 2.5b. Percent Naming Non-state Actors as Origins of Security Threats

	Civil Servant column % n=46	Parliamentarian column % n=15	Security Expert column % n=28	Overall column % n=89
<i>Biological/chemical attack</i>	19.6 (9)	6.7 (1)	25 (7)	19.1 (17)
<i>Conventional war</i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	15.2 (11)	20 (3)	7.1 (2)	18 (16)
<i>Cyber attack</i>	17.4 (8)	6.7 (1)	25 (7)	18 (16)
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	10.9 (5)	6.7 (1)	14.3 (4)	11.2 (10)
<i>Macroeconomic instability**</i>	2.2 (1)	20 (3)	25 (7)	12.4 (11)
<i>Man-made environmental</i>	39.1 (18)	33.3 (5)	57.1 (16)	43.8 (39)
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	13 (6)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	10.1 (9)
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	21.7 (10)	20 (3)	25 (7)	22.5 (20)
<i>Natural disaster/pandemics</i>	28.2 (13)	26.7 (4)	39.3 (11)	31.5 (28)
<i>Nuclear/radiological Attacks</i>	13 (6)	0 (0)	3.6 (1)	7.9 (7)
<i>Terrorism: critical infrastructure**</i>	56.5 (26)	13.3 (2)	42.9 (12)	44.9 (40)
<i>Terrorism: state or society</i>	54.3 (25)	20 (3)	46.4 (13)	46.1 (41)
<i>Other</i>	2.2 (1)	20 (3)	10.7 (3)	7.9 (7)

Notes: p < .01

Table 2.6. Mean Importance of the European Union

	Civil Servant	Parliamentarian	Security Expert	Overall
<i>Biological/chemical attack</i>	2.67(1.40)	3.38 (1.54)	2.52(1.23)	2.74(1.39)
<i>Conventional war</i>	2.76(1.38)	2.71(1.80)	2.33(1.40)	2.62(1.45)
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	3.26(1.16)	3.58(.90)	3.12(1.31)	3.27(1.17)
<i>Cyber attack</i>	2.74(1.29)	3.31(1.23)	3.17(1.49)	2.96(1.35)
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	2.94(1.39)	3.53(1.35)	3.04(1.43)	3.07(1.40)
<i>Macroeconomic instability</i>	3.48(1.02)	3.38(1.15)	3.90(1.30)	3.59(1.13)
<i>Man-made environmental</i>	2.16(1.13)	3.54(1.45)	3.52(1.30)	3.33(1.24)
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	3.33(1.07)	3.58(1.38)	3.52(1.18)	3.43(1.15)
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	3.03(1.32)	3.73(1.27)	3.29(1.16)	3.23(1.28)
<i>Natural disaster/pandemics</i>	2.86(1.23)	3.11(1.66)	3.12(1.21)	2.98(1.30)
<i>Nuclear/radiological attacks</i>	2.72(1.45)	2.96(1.51)	2.46(1.29)	2.68(1.41)
<i>Terrorism: critical infrastructure**</i>	3.02(1.41)	3.67(1.37)	2.35(1.41)	2.92(1.45)
<i>Terrorism: state or society**</i>	3.08(1.40)	3.58(1.62)	2.40(1.38)	2.95(1.47)
<i>Base n (varies by question)</i>	42-44	12-13	24	79-81

Notes: ** Inter-group differences significant at .05; standard deviations in parentheses

**Table 2.7. Special budgetary allocations for security related functions,
2001-2005 (C\$ billion)**

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Military			0.27	0.8	12.8 (over 5 years)
Peacekeeping				0.3	
Security (of which)	7.7 (over 5 years)			0.6	
<i>Border initiatives</i>	1.3				
<i>Intelligence and policing</i>	1.6				
<i>Screening of entrants</i>	1.0				
<i>Emergency preparedness</i>	1.6				
<i>Air security</i>	2.2				
<i>Coast Guard</i>			0.95 (over 2 years)		
Other allocations					
<i>Trade promotion (in US)</i>			0.11		
<i>International assistance</i>			1.4		3.4 (over 5 years)
<i>Peace/security initiatives</i>					0.5
<i>Diplomatic representation</i>					0.042 (over 5 years)
<i>Embassies security</i>					0.059

Sources: Compiled from data in <http://www.fin.gc.ca/access/budinfoe.html#year>

Table 2.8. Canadian Military Expenditures 1990 and 2000-2005

	1990	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
C\$ (billion)	13.4	12.3	13.1	13.3	14.1	14.9	15.5

Source: http://www.nato.int/issues/defence_expenditures/index.html

Table 2.9. Distribution of Budgetary and Manpower Resources

	Civil Servant column % (n=46)	Parliamentarian column % (n=15)	Security Expert column % (n=28)	Overall column % (n=89)
<i>Aligned</i>	28.3 (13)	60(9)	32.1(9)	34.8 (31)
<i>Misaligned</i>	71.7 (33)	40(6)	67.9(19)	65.3 (58)

Note: Cramer's V = .24, insig.

Table 2.10. Evaluations of National Defence Budget and Military Modernisation

	Civil Servant column % (n)	Parliamentarian Column % (n)	Security Expert column % (n)	Overall column % (n)
Size of budget				
<i>Too large</i>	4.3(2)	21.4(3)	7.4(2)	8 (2)
<i>Just about right</i>	41.3(19)	59(7)	33.3(9)	40.2 (35)
<i>Too little</i>	54.3(25)	28.6(4)	59.3(16)	51.7 (45)
Cramer's V=.19, insig.				
Distribution of defence budget meets needs?				
<i>Yes</i>	33.3(15)	53.8(7)	18.5(5)	31.8 (27)
<i>No</i>	66.7(30)	46.2(6)	81.5(22)	68.2 (58)
Cramer's V=.24, insig.				
Sufficient funds to military modernisation?^a				
<i>Too much</i>	2.2 (1)	14.3 (2)	7.4 (2)	5.8 (5)
<i>Just about right</i>	44.4 (20)	57.1 (8)	25.9 (7)	40.7 (35)
<i>Too little</i>	53.3 (24)	28.6 (4)	66.7 (18)	53.5 (46)

^a Insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis

Table 2.11. Satisfaction with Distribution of Defence Budget Spending

	Civil Servant column % (n)	Parliamentarian column % (n)	Security Expert column % (n)	Overall column % (n)
Personnel^a				
<i>Too much</i>	6.3(2)	11.1(1)	4.5(1)	6.3 (4)
<i>Just about right</i>	34.4(11)	22.2(2)	18.2(4)	27 (17)
<i>Too little</i>	59.4(19)	66.7(6)	77.3(17)	66.7 (42)
Procurement				
<i>Too much</i>	21.9(7)	33.3(3)	13.6(3)	20.6 (13)
<i>Just about right</i>	12.5(4)	33.3(3)	13.6(3)	15.9 (10)
<i>Too little</i>	65.6(21)	33.3(3)	72.7(16)	63.5 (40)
Cramer's V=.19, insig.				
Research and Development^a				
<i>Too much</i>	0(0)	0(0)	5(1)	1.7 (1)
<i>Just about right</i>	20(6)	44.4(4)	15(3)	22 (13)
<i>Too little</i>	80(24)	55.6(5)	80(16)	76.3 (45)

^a Insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis

Table 2.12. Perceptions of ESDP and US Commitment to European Security

	Civil Servant column % (n)	Parliamentarian column % (n)	Security Expert column % (n)	Overall column % (n)
More autonomous ESDP weaken NATO?				
<i>Little/ not at all (write-in)</i>	14.3 (6)	14.3 (2)	29.6 (8)	19.3 (16)
<i>Some/very much</i>	40.5 (17)	28.6 (4)	55.6 (15)	43.4 (36)
<i>Don't know</i>	45.2 (19)	57.1 (8)	14.8 (4)	37.3 (31)
Cramer's V=.24, p < .05				
Weaker NATO leads to retrenchment of US commitment to European security?				
<i>Yes</i>	32.6 (15)	28.6 (4)	32.1 (9)	31.8 (28)
<i>Maybe</i>	37 (17)	21.4 (3)	42.9 (12)	36.4 (32)
<i>No</i>	15.2 (7)	28.6 (4)	21.4 (6)	19.3 (17)
<i>Don't know</i>	15.2 (7)	21.4 (3)	3.6 (1)	12.5 (11)
Cramer's V=.17, insig.				
American commitment to European security...?				
<i>Essential/very important</i>	43.5 (20)	33.3 (5)	44.4 (12)	42 (37)
<i>Important</i>	34.8 (16)	46.7 (7)	37 (10)	37.5 (33)
<i>Inessential/not very important</i>	21.7 (10)	20 (3)	18.5 (5)	20.5 (18)
Cramer's V=.07, insig.				

Table 2.13. Mean Evaluations of Canada's Interstate Interactions and Security Conceptions

	Civil Servant	Parliamentarian	Security Expert	Overall
<i>Interstate Interaction</i>				
Mean (s.d.)	7.6 (1.36)	7.21 (2.14)	7.54 (1.43)	7.54 (1.49)
Minimum/Maximum	2.5/10	3.5/10	3/10	2.5/10
N=	46	12	28	86
F-score=.375, insig.				
<i>Security Conceptions</i>				
Mean (s.d.)	6.5(1.82)	6.69 (2.32)	6.71 (2.14)	6.60 (1.99)
Minimum/Maximum	1.5/9.5	3/10	1.5/9.5	1.5/10
N=	46	13	28	87
F-score=.116, insig.				

Notes: standard deviation (s.d.) in parentheses

Table 2.14. Opinions about the Continental Security Perimeter

	Civil Servant column % (n)	Parliamentarian column % (n)	Security Expert column % (n)	Overall column % (n)
<i>Strongly in favour</i>	11.9 (5)	11.1 (1)	6.3 (1)	10.4 (7)
<i>In favour</i>	47.6 (20)	44.4 (4)	37.5 (6)	44.8 (30)
<i>Opposed</i>	23.8 (10)	22.2 (2)	37.5 (6)	26.9 (18)
<i>Strongly opposed</i>	16.7 (7)	22.2 (2)	18.8 (3)	17.9 (12)
Cramer's V=.11, insig.				

Table 2.15: Completed Sample Descriptives, percentage

	Civil Servants	MPs and Senators	Security Experts
<i>Response rate</i>	3.2	6.2	31.2
<i>Average age/yrs.</i>	46.1	62.6	48.2
<i>Males</i>	65.2	53.3	64.3
<i>Females</i>	19.6	26.7	17.9
<i>Unknown</i>	15.2	20	17.9
<i>Party affiliation:</i>	Not applicable		Not applicable
<i>Conservative</i>		13.3	
<i>Liberal</i>		53.3	
<i>NDP</i>		6.7	
<i>Bloc</i>		0	
<i>Unknown</i>		26.7	
<i>Urban constituency</i>	Not applicable	40	Not applicable
<i>Rural constituency</i>		13.3	
<i>Unknown</i>		46.7	

Table 2.16: Study Population Descriptives, percentage

	Civil Servants	MPs and Senators*	Security Experts
<i>Average age/yrs.</i>	All public service: 44 yrs Executive category: 50 yrs.	55 years	Unknown
<i>Males</i>	Executive: 62.8 Administration and Foreign Service: 39.7	76	83.6
<i>Females</i>	Executive: 37.2 Administration and Foreign Service: 60.3	24	16.4
<i>Political Party:</i>	Not applicable		Not applicable
<i>Conservative</i>		36.6	
<i>Liberal</i>		39.7	
<i>Bloc</i>		12.3	
<i>NDP</i>		7.3	
<i>Independent</i>		1.4	
<i>Senate vacancies</i>		2.7	
<i>Urban</i>	Not applicable		Not applicable
<i>Rural</i>			
<i>Unknown</i>			

Sources: Parliament of Canada, 2006; Public Service Human Resources Management Agency, 2006;

*Age (weighted) and party affiliation data based on all members of the House of Commons and Senate.