

Chapter 21
Regional Institutions
Louise Fawcett

Abstract

This chapter considers the role of regional institutions in the provision of international security. It looks at the history and development of regionalism in the security sphere, and the evolving relationship between the United Nations (UN) and regional institutions. Employing a wide historical and comparative perspective, it considers both the conditions behind the growth of regional security projects, and explanations for their success and failure. Though there has been increasing demand for regional security provision, reflected in the growth and development of institutions, their record is mixed, showing considerable variation from region to region, depending on both local conditions and interests of external powers. It is also subject to debate: there is little consensus about the value of international institutions in security affairs on the one hand, and the comparative advantage of regional institutions over global actors like the UN on the other. Despite such limitations however, regional institutions have become increasingly important in security provision worldwide, and their roles are recognized by multilateral institutions, states and non-state actors.

Introduction

Viewed from the perspective of the early twenty-first century, the rise of the regional security institutions over the past half century looks impressive. Before the Second World War, there were few formal international institutions and even fewer dealing explicitly with security matters: the main exception was the League of Nations. Since then their numbers have grown steadily if unevenly. By the end of the twentieth century, of a growing array of intergovernmental regional organizations (Diehl 2005), over 25 included a commitment to security provision – in Europe, Africa, the Americas, Asia, and the Middle East/Islamic world (see Table 21.1). When one considers that much earlier institutional growth was identified primarily with economic integration this is particularly notable.

Table 21.1	Major Regional institutions with security provision 1945-2007
	() defunct institutions / name change
Africa	OAU/AU, IGADD/IGAD, ECOWAS, SADCC/SADC, CEMAC
Europe	EC/EU, WEU, NATO, (Warsaw Pact) OSCE, CIS, CSTO
Asia	(SEATO), ASEAN, SAARC, ARF, SCO, CACO, ICO
Middle East	LAS, (CENTO), GCC, AMU, (ACC), ECO, ICO
Americas	OAS, CARICOM, OECS, MERCOSUR
Australasia	ANZUS, SPF/PIF

Equally impressive is the range of their activities: from peacekeeping and dispute settlement to arms control and foreign policy coordination. Box 21.1 highlights the diverse security roles of a selected group of regional organizations.

Box 21.1: Security activities of selected regional institutions

Confidence building measures
 Defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity
 Peacekeeping
 Security and economic development
 Peaceful settlement of disputes
 Foreign policy coordination
 Security cooperation
 Resolution of border disputes
 Disarmament and arms control
 Preventive diplomacy
 Freedom, security and justice
 Safeguarding of national rights
 Combating terrorism, drugs and weapons trafficking
 Peace enforcement
 Election monitoring
 Institution building
 Non-proliferation

Further, while they have become more active in their own right, more and more regional institutions have also become involved in collaborative security ventures, typically with the UN, but also with other regional/cross-regional institutions, and an array of non-governmental organizations (Pugh and Sidhu 2003). This collaboration is particularly

evident today in the area of peace operations (see Chapter 27 this volume). Since the 1990s a growing number of major peacekeeping operations have counted on the participation of the UN and a variety of regional organizations. At the end of 2005, some 15 regional organizations were involved in collaborative peacekeeping/peacemaking activities (CIC 2006). Member states of the African Union (AU) in 2006 provided over 75 percent of all UN peacekeepers in Africa, as well as running their own operations.

Finally, these new security roles of regional organizations, though still relatively understudied, have been increasingly recognized by states, the UN and other actors. Earlier and widely expressed scepticism about the values of such institutions has given way to acknowledgment of their potential. They are part of the 'explosion of international activism', highlighted by the Human Security Report (2005), that is seen as responsible for decline in conflict overall. In the words of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 'multilateral institutions and regional security organizations have never been more important than today' (UN/SG/SM/8543: 9/12/2002).

What do the above developments amount to in real terms and how can they be explained? While a 'new wave of regionalism in security affairs' can readily be identified (Lake and Morgan 1997), it is harder to demonstrate that it has established deep or enduring roots or significantly altered the contours of world politics. Indeed the real significance of the current regional wave, like the previous waves discussed here, remains a matter of debate.

First, the evidence of its impact itself is mixed. The number of institutions in existence tells us little about their remit and effectiveness. The lofty rhetoric found in their charters and mission statements of is often unmatched in practice, and practice itself varies widely. Some well established regional organizations have registered important advances in the security domain, whether in Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America or Europe; the record of others – in the Middle East, South or Central Asia – for example, remains limited. There is no regular or easily identifiable pattern or process to the development of security regionalism. Latin American, South Pacific and Southeast Asian countries have

successfully established and maintained a nuclear-free zone throughout their regions. In South Asia, the two major regional powers, India and Pakistan, have gone nuclear, while the commitment of the League of Arab States (LAS) to remove all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from the Middle East has failed, with Israel's nuclear capacity well established and Iran moving closer to becoming a nuclear power.

Second, the very value of such institutions, whether international or regional, is subject to different interpretations (Higgott 2006). At one end of the spectrum, scholars argue that institutions have helped to shape the way states think about security and community. Institutions promote dialogue and learning among states allowing them to rethink their security priorities and behaviour, and embark upon collaborative ventures (Deutsch 1957). In these accounts regional identities may play important roles in determining how states chose partners in cooperation and over which areas they choose to cooperate (Barnett 1998). In the middle ground are those who see institutions as serving useful purposes in situations of interdependence, allowing states to benefit from common rules and procedures. In this rational actor model regional identity is incidental to cooperation. At the other end of the spectrum are those who express scepticism as to whether institutions, of any type, promote security and international order (Mearsheimer 1994/95). Institutions are transient and reflect current power balances in the international system. The idea of the region is only important in as much as strong regional states, or alliances of states, may be instrumental in trying to achieve a more favourable balance of power for their members.

Third, even the desirability of regionalism, in theory or practice, is contested. Though some argue that regional security might be the gateway to global security, that peace might be obtained 'in parts' to quote the title of an early work by Joseph Nye (1971), an equally strong body of opinion supports the view that regionalism should be considered at best complementary and secondary, at worst detrimental to global efforts to promote peace and security. Drawing on early idealist thinking about international organization, which promoted universal over particularistic values, there is still a wide consensus that the UN, or some universal body, should be the main security provider. In this account,

the promotion of regional security contradicts the search for global security; regional organizations cannot be impartial and will be susceptible to the ambitions of strong regional powers (Dorn 1998). In other words, if international security institutions have value, this should be sought and promoted at the global level, by a truly international not regional society.

Organization of the Chapter

Against this background of ambivalence about the nature and significance of regionalism, this chapter examines the existing evidence and offers some tentative conclusions about the current and future roles of regional institutions in security affairs. The following section looks at the history and evolution of regional security institutions since the Second World War. The third section surveys some aspects of the contemporary regional security arena, looking at the role of institutions in peace operations and their relations with the UN. It also considers how institutions have fared in dealing with the 'latest' security threats of terrorism and the spread of WMD. The final section assesses the growth of security regionalism and concludes with a consideration of its contemporary significance and future prospects.

Note on Terms

What is a regional institution and what defines the security component of a regional institution? All three terms: 'regional,' 'security' and 'institutions' are subject to differing interpretations, so a note of clarification on their use here is needed. In International Relations, institutions refer to formal organizations with 'prescribed hierarchies and capacity for purposive action' and to international regimes with 'complexes of rules and organizations, the core elements of which have been negotiations and explicitly agreed upon by states' (Keohane 1988). Regional institutions are regimes and formal organizations comprising a membership which is limited to a particular geographical region, or perhaps to two or more proximate regions (NATO or ARF for example), though other definitions based more loosely around issues, activities and ideas have also been used (e.g. Nye 1968, Katzenstein 1996, Russett 1967). Though such institutions may be formal or informal and include state or non-state actors, the focus here, for reasons of

precision and economy, is on formal state-based regional, or cross-regional, organizations (see Hettne 2004, for contrast), a choice justified by noting that the state remains the gatekeeper of most global security activity (Russett and O'Neal 2001).

The *security* dimension of regional institutions may be understood in two different, though related ways. First, it could be interpreted as the attempt to promote peaceful and predictable relations among its members, to build security and community through cooperation (Adler and Barnett 1998). This loose understanding of security could be said to apply to any regional organization. Second, and more formally, a regional security institution can be understood as an organization whose charter contains an explicit reference to *security provision* through the coordination of defence, security and foreign policy at some level. This distinction may be understood by contrasting the early European Community (EC) project with that of the later European Union (EU). Security provision is designed to meet threats arising from inter and intrastate conflicts. The focus here will be principally on the more measurable forms of security provision, less on security understood as community building, though the two are often linked.

The Origins and Development of Regional Security Institutions

The growth of regional institutions dates from the Second World War and is part of a general pattern of growth in international institutions. Three main types of early regional institution can readily be identified: first, multipurpose institutions, like the LAS, Organization of American States (OAS) or Organization of African Unity (OAU); second, those with principally an economic focus, like the EC; and third, security alliances like NATO, SEATO and CENTO. The emphasis here is on institutions with an explicit security component, or the first and third types. Even if the different functions of regional institutions may be closely related, with security regionalism perhaps springing from economic regionalism, there is no necessary link or 'spillover' effect as some early integration theorists predicted (Haas 1958). Not all regional economic institutions have developed security provision, nor do all regional security institutions have provision for

economic cooperation (NATO is one example). Security cooperation is not necessarily harder (or easier) to achieve than economic cooperation.

In the area of regional security, three broad waves of institutional growth can be identified from 1945 to the present: the first coinciding with the immediate post-Second World War and early Cold War period (see Table 21.2), the second occurring in the mid to late Cold War period (Table 21.3), and the third, and most recent wave, in the first post-Cold War decade (Table 21.4). There has been little *new* institution building since the turn of the century, though a number of institutions have continued to expand and develop their capacity in different areas. For each wave, institutional growth correlates with change and development in the international system and with state formation and breakdown. The last major systemic change, which saw both the birth and death of a number of institutions, was the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet bloc.

Prior to the Second World War, formal security institutions were few and regional security institutions non-existent. The Inter-American system, with its roots in the late nineteenth century, was not a formal security institution, though it embodied the idea of a security regime expressed for example in the Monroe Doctrine, which singled out the Americas as part of a US sphere of influence. Other security regimes were evident in nineteenth century Europe, where the idea of a ‘concert’ or balance of powers clearly informed understanding of regional order. It was only when this loose regime was finally broken by the onset of the First World War, that international statesmen, led by US President Woodrow Wilson, made the first sustained attempt at constructing a formal security institution: the League of Nations.

The League experiment, though intended to be universal, betrayed a number of regional features, not least that its dominant members were all European. A reference in the Covenant, in Article 21, to ‘regional understandings’, was included to attract the United States, which did not become a member, and the Monroe Doctrine was the only understanding actually mentioned (Zimmern 1945). More broadly, the League period set the tone for a wider and ongoing debate about how to deal with the problem of

integrating regional arrangements into the framework of a general security organization. This debate was overtaken by the events of the 1930s when Europe, and much of the rest of the world, became embroiled in a new war. By this time it was evident that the League failed as a security institution, and regionalism had been negatively associated with Japan's pan-Asian project, or the Nazi's European one.

Regional Security Institutions in the Cold War

It was against this backdrop that the UN was constructed and the first wave of regional institution building took place. The League's example, both positive and negative, informed the development of a new set of international institutions after 1945. At one level such institutions were constructed precisely to prevent the social, political and economic upheavals that had taken the world to war after 1939, and hence to do better than the League. At another, not entirely complementary level, they were designed to make new and old states – feel more secure. If few states thus questioned the need for a more ambitious universal security organization, many sought to protect their own interests through regional or cross regional groupings.

Table 21.2 Cold War Regional Security Institutions: The First Wave 1945-65	
<i>Multi purpose institutions</i>	<i>security alliances/ institutions</i>
(Commonwealth), LAS, OAS, OAU	NATO, Warsaw Pact, SEATO, Baghdad Pact/CENTO, ANZUS, WEU

Already by 1945, the first such regional institutions, representing not only the Americas, but also the Commonwealth, and Arab states had come into being, in a pattern that would soon be replicated in Africa with the creation of the OAU in 1963. The final design of the UN Charter, like the League Covenant before it, was strongly influenced by states with investments in such institutions. Despite the widely expressed reservations by UN founding fathers (notably US President Roosevelt) about diluting its universal aspirations and competence, regional interests were simply too strong to be ignored. The UN Charter thus endorsed the principle of regional partnership and action, though always within the framework of the global security organization.

The provisions regarding the role of regional agencies, and their relationship with the UN, are clustered in Chapter VIII, Articles 51-54, though a number of references can also be found elsewhere in the Charter. They focus almost exclusively on their contribution to peace and security. Article 51 endorses the right of states to collective self defence; in Article 52, regional agencies are called upon to ‘make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes ... before referring them to the Security Council’. The Charter is ambiguous as to which types of regional actors and institutions are appropriate for Chapter VIII partnerships, leaving this open to a variety of interpretations, though in time different agencies would be periodically singled out and praised for their roles (Schreuer 1995, Sarooshi 1998).

The construction of the first formal regional organizations, and their acknowledgement by the UN, were responses to impending and actual changes in the international system, brought about both by the war itself and the end of European Empires. Now these institutions had to readapt to a new international environment characterized by the Cold War. In this environment it was clear that the power of regional actors, particularly where new Third World states were concerned, would be severely constrained. Their very newness and lack of diplomatic expertise were part of the problem, and resources were scarce. Cold War ‘overlay’ also further reduced the autonomy of weaker states (Buzan 1991). While the US was able to maintain its privileged position within the new American institutions, weaker states in the new regional institutions had less room for manoeuvre.

For different reasons, the early general purpose organizations are often regarded as failures, at least in the short-term (Haas 1993). They were unable, for example, to foster regional security whether understood as securing their regions against external threats on the one hand, or promoting ideas of regional community on the other. Their regions suffered from civil wars and external intervention. On the other hand, these new institutions, given the obvious difficulties they faced, were not wholly unsuccessful in forging common positions on issues of great importance to their members such as

decolonization and apartheid (in the African case) or support for Palestine (in the Arab one). Peacekeeping roles were also played by the OAU, OAS and the Arab League in conflicts over Chad, Dominican Republic and Kuwait and Lebanon respectively. Institutions thus had an early role to play in assisting the 'weak in the world of the strong' and states were inclined to support them (Rothstein 1977).

The rise of the Cold War alliance system undoubtedly complicated this picture. On the one hand, it can be argued that by far the most successful regional security institutions were those on either of the East-West divide: the Warsaw Pact and NATO respectively. If the Cold War has been characterized as the 'The Long Peace' (Gaddis 1987) it was the role of these two institutions and their superpower patrons that was critical in keeping that peace through the maintenance of a stable balance of power. On the other hand, these security alliances and the bilateral and multilateral arrangements they promoted, both bypassed the UN system and influenced both the global and regional security picture, offering very little scope for regional organizations either to develop their own arrangements, or the type of security relationships detailed in Chapter VIII.

Neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact were designed as Chapter VIII institutions; they retained full autonomy of action, bypassing the careful wording of Article 103, on the primacy of UN obligations over 'any other international agreement'. If the very presence of NATO was a major factor in removing security from the agenda of the West European states, thus helping to explain the EC's early successes in economic integration, the same could not be said to apply to other regions. Efforts by the United States to create regional security organizations to serve similar Cold War purposes, whether in Southeast Asia (SEATO), the Middle East (Baghdad Pact/CENTO) or Australasia (ANZUS) were far less successful except for the latter, and even divisive in the case of the CENTO. Ultimately Cold War security on the periphery was achieved through bilateral alliances rather than formal institutional arrangements. Japan, for example, though its bilateral security treaty with the US was arguably far more secure than most of the states that formed part of either SEATO or CENTO.

It was in reaction to this superpower dominance of the regional security arena, the disappointing early results of multipurpose institutions and the changing regional security environment itself, that a second wave of institution building occurred, mainly among developing countries. This new wave of security regionalism, which took place between 1966 and 1986, should be distinguished from the earlier wave of mostly economic regionalism that had been inspired by the creation and successful early years of the EC (Nye 1968). It was similar in that it was mostly sub-regional in scope (with sub-regional here meaning sub-continental, or at least encompassing a smaller geographical space and fewer states than the earlier pan regional groups), though it also included both a pan-European security institution, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and a pan-Islamic institution, the ICO.

Table 21.3 Cold War Regional Security Institutions: The Second Wave 1966-86	
<i>sub-regional institutions</i>	<i>pan-regional institutions</i>
ASEAN, CARICOM, SPF, ECOWAS, OECS,	CSCE, ICO
OECS, SADCC, ECO, GCC, SAARC, AMU, (ACC)	
(ACC)	

Overall, this second wave was characterized by small steps to improve regional self-sufficiency and cooperation in a changed regional and global environment which afforded a little more flexibility to regional actors. Bipolarity had somewhat loosened in the détente era of the late-1960s to mid-1970s, while many developing countries had consolidated their statehood and autonomy. Not all these new institutions immediately assumed security roles; a number had ostensibly more economic functions and purposes: the GCC is an interesting case of an institution designed to meet a security threat whose charter is couched in mainly economic and cultural terms (see Article 4, www.gcc-sg.org/CHARTER). Still there was a clear security dimension to this second wave of institution building. In fact many of these second wave security institutions were constructed with a particular local threat in mind: for ASEAN it was Vietnam, for the GCC, revolutionary Iran; for SADCC apartheid South Africa. The short-lived Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) was conceived as a vehicle for the containment of Iraq. However the overlay features of the Cold War were also present, and continued to restrict options. This was of course true for the CSCE, a quite different pan-European security

enterprise, which by encouraging East-West convergence in several areas played a facilitating role in the end of the Cold War.

The results of this second wave, like the first, were mixed, but a couple of points should be noted. As in the first wave, institutional survival rates were high: few institutions died (except the security pacts, CENTO and SEATO, and the short lived ACC), showing how they were valued by their members. They were also flexible: as their *raison d'être* was increased by the new balance of power at end of the Cold War, many went on to expand their security roles.

Regional Security Institutions since the Cold War

The international system had closely defined the parameters and possibilities of security regionalism in the Cold War. It was system change that also helps explain the post-Cold War changes and developments. The very growth and expansion of regional security projects cannot be understood without reference to the post-Cold War environment, which changed the parameters of the security domain and made regional security both more vulnerable and more accessible to local actors. This exposure of the 'regional security complex' (Buzan and Wæver 2003) gave rise to a new wave of regionalism (see also Chapter 5 this volume). Like earlier waves, the post-Cold War regionalism has been the subject of much debate and a growing literature, but the evidence on the security side merits examining on its own terms (Lake and Morgan 1997).

At first, there was a distinctly universal flavour to the post-Cold War order which did not immediately suggest an important role for regional institutions. Just as the two world wars had seen the birth and rebirth of universal paradigms of global order, reflected in the early ethos of League and the UN, the end of the Cold War era was similarly informed by idealized notions about the possibilities of global institutions and projects, even global peace. This was picked up in the rhetoric of the 'New World Order' articulated by US President George Bush Sr., after the 1991 Gulf War, and in popular works on the end of history, ideology, geography and so on. These big ideas were captured by different understandings of the term globalization. As in the past, regionalism was viewed by some

as a mere stepping stone, by others as potentially obstructive and damaging to broader global processes.

Two things illustrated regionalism's potential and possible trajectory. First, was the experience of Western Europe. Though the evidence from Europe on the eve of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) was mixed, the European process could not easily be disregarded. Even if the experience of the EU was not readily or immediately exportable, it still represented an important model of how cooperation might be conducted at the regional level. And non-European institutions did start to grow quickly after the Cold War ended. The EU was also poised to move away from a predominantly economic focus to one which also emphasized security cooperation.

Second, and less tangible, was the so-called 'clash of civilizations' thesis (Huntington 1993). This clumsy characterization made the point that 'civilizations', often loose regions, could not be homogenized and had creative and fragmentary power. In a somewhat related vein, Ian Clark (1997) showed how processes of globalization and fragmentation had competed and coexisted historically and were likely to continue to do so in the future. In this sense regionalism, construed as a response to the global other, merely extended the project that had commenced with the early Third World regionalisms and the second wave of regionalism in the latter decades of the Cold War.

From a practical perspective, it quickly became clear that the post-Cold War multilateral structures, given the huge demands placed upon them, would need buttressing. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the area of conflict resolution. In calling for the revival of Chapter VIII provision, UN Secretary-Generals were not advocating regionalism per se, but burden sharing (Boutros Ghali 1992). The UN, despite the euphoria that accompanied its early post-Cold War years (a euphoria which peaked in the Gulf War of 1991), lacked the resources and the commitment of major states to act as a global security provider, creating vacuums that regional powers and institutions sought to fill (Weiss, Price and Zacher 2004). Hence the new wave of security regionalism must be understood in terms of UN capacity, the relative disinterest of great powers in costly external interventions

and former alliance systems. It represented the further development of a self help system for weaker states to cope with the new security environment. It also permitted stronger regional powers the scope to set local agendas within a legitimate institutional framework.

The third wave of security regionalism was characterized by two main developments: the upgrading of security provision in existing institutions and the creation of new ones (Table 21.4). Like the third wave of democratization, there were few regions which did not participate in this new wave. New institutions were formed in the Asia-Pacific region and in the former Soviet space. China entered into regional security arrangements for the first time. Major reforms were introduced in a number of existing institutions, notably in Europe, the Americas and Africa, where additional protocols, treaties and conventions were signed relating to conflict prevention and management, human rights and democracy. A great deal has already been written about the nature and purpose of this ‘new’ regionalist moment, and its varied and arguably novel dimensions (e.g. Soderbaum and Shaw 2003). However one regards it – and there is a case to be made for continuity as well as change – the quantitative evidence is noteworthy.

Table 21.4 Post Cold War Regional Security Institutions: The Third Wave 1987-2007

<i>new institutions</i>	<i>renamed institutions/new agenda</i>
CIS, CSTO, SCO, ARF, APEC, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, CACO	OAS, ECOWAS-ECOMOG, CSCE-OSCE, UDEAC-CEMAC, EC-EU, SPF- PIF, OAU-AU, IGADD/IGAD, SADC-SADC

A brief glance at some of these institutions helps to illustrate this point. First, in Europe the EU’s moves, since 1992, to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and then a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have been well documented. Forces from EU member states have been involved in a growing number of peace operations inside and outside Europe and discussions continue on the establishment of an EU rapid reaction force and battle groups (Dinan 2005). The wider Europe has seen the development of the CSCE into the OSCE, following the Paris Summit of 1990, marking its move from a more informal conference to a formal organization, acquiring permanent institutions and operational capabilities. Comprising 56 member states it was, in 2006,

the largest regional security organization in the world, followed by the African Union (www.osce.org).

NATO has overcome early doubts about its post-Cold War future, attracting new members and engaging in 'out of area' operations from Kosovo to Afghanistan. Within the former Soviet bloc, there has been institution building (CIS, CSTO, CACO) to fill gaps left by the demise of Cold War structures. East European and Baltic states have also looked west for association and membership of existing structures like the EU and NATO. Russia was party to the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, (successor to the Shanghai Five), which has provided a forum where Central Asian states can engage with China (Allison 2004). Less well-known was the expansion, in 1992, of the Economic Conference Organization (ECO) to include Afghanistan and the six muslim republics of the former USSR.

Moving to the Asia Pacific, the creation, in 1994, of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a cross regional association of 25 states including China, Russia, Japan, the EU and the USA, gave substance to ideas of a broader multilateral security forum in Asia. ASEAN, with the admission of Cambodia in 1999, now includes all Southeast Asian countries, no small feat considering the severity of earlier regional rivalries.

Important changes have taken place in African institutions. In its 1991 summit the OAU made regional integration a priority and established mechanisms for conflict management. During the 1990s, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD and CEMAC underwent major restructuring, all assuming greater politico-security roles including peacekeeping. Finally, in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) the framework was laid for an African Parliament, Court of Justice, Peer Review Mechanism and African Standby Force, providing the pillars for a potentially far more robust pan-regional institution.

Latin America has also seen important new institutional developments. MERCOSUR was set up in 1991; initially as a trade agreement, but one which expanded by 1998 to include commitments to regional democracy in the 'compromiso democratico' and peace (see

www.mercosur.int/msweb/). The OAS Santiago Declaration (June 1991) also made the link between democracy and security; followed up by the Interamerican Democratic Charter in 2001. CARICOM in 2001 established a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security to address the security issues arising from illicit drugs, arms and money laundering. NAFTA has no explicit tripartite security mechanism, though from a community perspective it has been instrumental in consolidating Mexican democracy. Security, though, given border and illicit trafficking concerns, is an inescapable feature of US-Mexico relations.

Contemporary Challenges

In examining the capacity and achievements of the contemporary regional institutions in the security domain, two areas can be singled out: peace operations and the coordination of anti-terror and WMD policies. These by no means exhaust the different types of security activities undertaken by institutions since the Cold War, but provide some useful indicators of their roles and effectiveness.

Peace Operations

Regional actors, not always formal regional institutions, have been active in a variety of solo and joint peacekeeping operations since the 1990s, many in conjunction with the UN (Weiss 1998). This is in sharp contrast to the Cold War. Figure 21.1 illustrates the significant rise in what are now termed ‘peace operations’ conducted by UN and non-UN actors, a large proportion of which are regional organizations. The range of these operations is wide: from enforcement missions like that of NATO in Kosovo, to election monitoring or institution building, like those of the EU or OSCE in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see CIC 2006).

***** Insert Figure 21.1 about here *******

The high demand for peacekeeping and the fact that the UN is not always the 'mediator of choice' (Hampson 2004) has encouraged regional organizations to take on more roles in this area. Again, a review of the range of their activities is illustrative.

Starting from the involvement of ECOWAS in the Liberian conflict in 1990 leading to a joint UN peacekeeping operation in 1993 (UNOMIL), there has been steady and growing involvement of regional organizations in different aspects of peacekeeping in Africa. Peace operations have been undertaken in Burundi, the Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan, under the auspices of ECOWAS, SADC CEMAC and the AU.

The same is true of the wider Europe. Since the early 1990s the UN and European groups like the EU, OSCE, CIS and NATO have been involved in numerous peacekeeping and peace support missions in the Yugoslav and Soviet successor states. Such groups were brought together in Bosnia in the 1995 Dayton Accord, and in 1999 in Kosovo, where NATO was the major security provider, with the OSCE and EU working in the areas of democratization, institution building and economic reconstruction. In Georgia a UN mission works with the OSCE and CIS; the latter has also been involved in operations in Moldova and Tajikistan.

Outside Europe, EU forces have been engaged in monitoring missions in Indonesia and peace support operations in the DR Congo: Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD. Under a UN mandate, NATO took over the coordination of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in 2003, its first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. In the Americas, OAS action has supported democratic governments in Haiti, and since 2004, in Colombia, the organization has been involved in monitoring the demobilisation of paramilitary groups. The Pacific Islands Forum in 2003 authorized the sending of a Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands to restore order following inter-communal violence in the late 1990s.

In the Middle East two peace operations, legacies of the Arab-Israel conflict continue, but the region has seen little action by its own regional institutions, despite LAS efforts to mediate during the Lebanese crisis in 2006. The EU, in contrast, launched a mission in Palestine in 2006. The ICO has yet to take on a major peacekeeping role though it has provided observers and monitoring missions to Islamic countries in conflict.

In 2006-07, after a short-term decline in the numbers of regional peacekeepers and operations, there was a new phase of growth driven by the start-up of new missions and the expansion of NATO and EU operations in Afghanistan and the DR Congo respectively. With the AU's role in Darfur, Sudan the role of regional institutions in ever more complex peace operations looked set to continue. This situation is not just the result of incremental growth and development in the post-Cold War period, rather the severity of regional security concerns and the absence of other security providers, generating a high demand for regional action. Core states, aware of the opportunities and constraints of a regional security policy, have been willing to provide leadership.

A number of doubts have been expressed about the growth of security regionalism, both inside the UN and in the wider policy-making community (Job 2004). Issues of legitimacy and impartiality, as well as that of primacy in the relationship between the UN and regional actors have been raised. In the latter case the problem has been that regional organizations have conducted operations without prior authorization of the UN Security Council. Questions have also been asked about the tendency of strong regional states to impose their own security agendas: Russia in the CIS, Nigeria in ECOWAS, Australia in the PIF, or the US in NATO are some examples. Accepting the precedent of regionalization of security may produce the dangerous precedent of excluding areas like Africa from high quality peace operations (Bellamy and Williams 2005). Setting such problems aside, and given the present international environment and the limited capacity of multilateral institutions, the search for 'regional solutions to regional problems' is likely to continue.

The post-2001 security environment

The kinds of peace operations described above represent the most important element of the security agenda of regional institutions in the early twenty-first century. Another is the more recent concern about the spread of terrorism and WMD. Such security issues are nothing new; their novelty lies in the way that they have been identified as core security threats by dominant states and thus captured the centre of the security debate, demanding institutional responses. This has posed new challenges to security institutions, already in the process of readjustment after the Cold War.

A number of established regional institutions – NATO, the OAS, the OAU and the EU – already had anti-terrorist provision in place. The founding document of the SCO, drafted before the events of 9/11, singled out terrorism, separatism and extremism as ‘three evils’ to confront, reflecting the concerns of members like Russia and China. Regions are arguably well positioned to react to, monitor and deter terrorist activity, and most regional organizations have responded to recent events, by incorporating new mechanisms to deal with terrorist activity. The OAS has a sophisticated mechanism in the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism; the AU has adopted an additional protocol on the prevention and combating of terrorism; NATO has endorsed a new Concept for Defence against Terrorism; finally the EU in 2004 appointed a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.

The potential for regional organizations to act in this area is again highlighted by the difficulties faced by the UN in articulating a common position. As in the case of peace operations, however, the results are mixed. There is also the question as to extent to which states really wish to entrust such high politics (yet often domestic) security concerns to international institutions. Note for example how differences between NATO’s new concept and the 2006 US National Strategy for combating terrorism demonstrate the role of dominant states (de Nevers 2007). For developing countries, the emphasis on terrorism could be regarded as distracting attention from other more pressing regional security and development goals, a further argument for regionalism perhaps, but one which also demonstrates the way in which key system players continue to dominate and constrain local agendas.

The issues regarding WMD are similar in some ways, though this has long been the domain of multilateral action and treaties, less of regional agencies. Many regional institutions publicize commitments to non-proliferation and uphold the enforcement of existing treaty regimes. The EU, since 2003, has had in place an anti-proliferation policy to strengthen and universalize the existing multilateral system, though two EU states are themselves nuclear powers (European Security Strategy 2003).

ASEAN, South Pacific and Latin American states are exceptional in supporting nuclear-free zones through long-standing treaties. Twenty-four Latin American countries in 1967 signed the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty at Tlatelolco. ASEAN's summit in 1995 saw the signature of the Treaty on Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). African states, signatories to the Pelindaba Treaty, are also close to agreeing a nuclear-free zone. While there are rational arguments supporting such cooperation for the regions in question, one must ask what role in enforcing such regimes has been played by external actors (the US or China for example), and whether or not regional regimes could ever be effective in fully restraining the ambitions of an aspiring nuclear state.

Though the issue of WMD, like terrorism, could represent a new growth area with great possibilities for cooperation, evidence shows that in this high politics arena, security matters are still more likely to be handled outside regional frameworks – by the P-5, strong regional powers and multilateral institutions.

Assessing the Growth of Regional Security Institutions

This chapter has outlined the main developments in regional security institutions from 1945 to the present, with a view to understanding and demonstrating their contemporary significance. It has sought to throw more light on an important, but still understudied aspect of regionalism, and one in which explanations for cooperation differ: international

security is an area in which institutionalist theories expect that cooperation will be hardest to achieve.

Yet security cooperation has been achieved across a wide range of issues and regional institutions have generated more orderly relationships between states. Two features of this cooperation stand out. First, a major driver of regionalism in security affairs has been changes in the international system requiring states to respond to shifts in the global and regional balances of power. This is well illustrated by considering the timing and content of three waves of security regionalism. All were responses to the new balance of power in the international system with institutions designed to enhance and consolidate the position of both strong and new/weak states. Cooperation has been a means of increasing security, but also influence and bargaining power. The latest developments in the third wave, post-9/11, again suggest how regional organizations, in adapting to recent threats, are responding to the security imperatives of the dominant global powers – those most threatened by terrorism.

Second, states value institutions. If explanations of power balancing are useful in explaining the start up and changing functions of institutions, they are only part of the story. Institutions are not mere epiphenomena. They have survived and developed new functions, adjusting to changing conditions, including regime change and state type. In providing more predictable bases for cooperation and negotiation in an interdependent world, they have become invaluable tools of diplomacy and statecraft (Duffield 2006).

The above developments are less the result of a natural growth in functions and ideas about cooperation, an ongoing process of learning and dialogue, or deep seated regional preferences, but new institutions or charters for new purposes in a changing world order. Neither ECOWAS nor SADCC nor IGADD had ‘succeeded’ as economic or development institutions before they developed a security profile. They responded to new demands. The same is also true of Europe. If security spill-over has occurred, this development has as much to do with local threats, and the desire of the EU to reposition

itself as a great power and counterbalance the US, as it has to fostering common identity and purpose.

The notion of an European, Asian or African style of crisis management is not without significance. It is currently fashionable to consider how the language and form that regionalism takes reflects the identity and culture of states (Acharya 2000). Regions and regional security are self-evidently what states want to make of them, but what most states want is achievable security against external threats. The history of regionalism in security affairs suggests that one should be cautious about attributing too much significance to concepts of regional identity. More important is the need for regions to project their power and influence, however limited, while attending to their own security concerns in a way that preserves regional autonomy and order. The pro-sovereignty norm in ASEAN, the non-intervention tradition in the Americas, the expansion of AU instruments are about self-help and awareness that collective action is more likely to achieve results. Regional institutions are vehicles for coping with a security predicament, for alleviating state weakness in a hostile international environment (Ayoob 1995). Here, it is worth recalling the influential 'Responsibility to Protect' (ICISS 2001), which highlights the salience of security regionalism: 'Those states which can call upon *strong regional alliances*, internal peace and a strong and independent civil society seem best placed to benefit from globalization' (italics added).

In concluding, this chapter has argued that a useful distinction can be made between regionalism under bipolarity and regionalism under unipolarity. In both cases regionalism in security affairs must be understood as a response to the dominant security order – whether balancing against large powers or bandwagoning with them. The way in which the functions of regional organizations, and their memberships have shifted in line with dominant security trends supports this. Regional institutions do condition the behaviour of their members and provide parameters for action, but the propensity of institutions to switch roles in response to systemic changes suggests also the close correlation between material interests and collective behaviour. On the other hand, their survival and

maintenance indicate that states value institutions and are willing to bear their costs even during periods of uncertainty and failure.

Under unipolarity the trend towards further regional conflict management is set to continue. The UN, as highlighted in the *2005 World Summit Outcome* document, is likely to encourage rather than supplant the roles of regional organizations in the near future. The consequences of the overextension of US power can be seen in Iraq and elsewhere, demonstrating the demand for alternative sources of action. Strong states will continue to find useful legitimizing roles for regional institutions, and weak states will benefit from their security umbrella. To some extent then, security regionalism is on a path dependent trajectory unlikely to change unless and until some new critical turning point is reached.

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Figure 21.1 UN and Non-UN* Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-2005

